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SUMMARY 
The objective of th is thesis was to present a procedure to be 
used i n determining which expandable countermeasures a penetrating a i r ­
craf t should use against a given a i r defense system. I t i s shown that 
an optimum deployment st rategy, which speci f ies the type and number of 
countermeasures to be dispensed at various points along the a i r c r a f t ' s 
route , can be found. The decision c r i t e r ion on which the optimum 
strategy i s based include probabi l i ty of a i r c r a f t su rv iva l and cost-
effectiveness . 
In order to determine the optimum deployment st rategy, a mathe­
matical model was developed to re la te the parameters of the radar system 
and the var iables associated with the penetrating a i r c r a f t as we l l as 
the countermeasures. The output of the model i s the probabi l i ty of the 
a i r c r a f t surviving a section of the f l i g h t route. The probabi l i ty of 
s u r v i v a l , the decision c r i t e r i o n , and a capacity constraint are used to 
determine the optimum strategy. The cost-effect iveness c r i t e r i o n i s an 
expected cost expression which i s the sum of the determinist ic cost of 
the countermeasures and the cost associated with the possible loss of 




The Problem Statement 
Background 
When t a c t i c a l a i r forces f l y missions over enemy-held t e r r i t o r y , 
they usually encounter some type of defensive system. I t may be a com­
plex system, consisting of radars of d i f ferent types, a n t i a i r c r a f t 
a r t i l l e r y , missi le s i t e s , and manned in terceptors , or i t may be a 
simple system consisting of one missi le s i t e and i t s associated radar. 
Radar i s used by the a i r defense system to a id in detecting and 
tracking the penetrating forces . I t i s also used i n direct ing weapons, 
such as missi les and manned interceptors , into posit ion to intercept 
and destroy the penetrating forces . The radar i s an essent ia l l ink in 
the control element of the defensive system, and anything that reduces 
i t s e f fec t iveness , reduces the effect iveness of the ent i re system. 
The various techniques that e lec t ron ica l l y in ter fe re with radar 
performance are ca l led e lectronic countermeasures (ECM) (4,11,12,13,24). 
Countermeasures can be divided into two c lasses , ac t ive ECM and passive 
ECM. Act ive countermeasures are ca l led jammers. They e i ther create 
fa lse targets or mask the a i r c r a f t by radiat ing electromagnetic energy 
on the radar 's frequency. Passive countermeasures do not generate e lec ­
tromagnetic energy. They act in a passive manner, creating fa lse t a r ­
gets or masking the a i r c r a f t by re f l ec t ing large amounts of transmitted 
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energy back to the radar. Thus countermeasures i n both classes attempt 
to n u l l i f y the e f f i c i e n t operation of the radar system by e i ther deceiv­
ing the radar operators with fa lse ta rgets , or by saturat ing the radar 
display with su f f i c ien t c lu t te r to prevent the operators from detecting 
the a i r c r a f t . 
Another c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of countermeasures i s that of expendable 
and non-expendable countermeasures. Expendable countermeasures are 
considered non-recoverable a f ter use, and a l l passive countermeasures 
are in that c l a s s . Non-expendable countermeasures are generally those 
carr ied on the a i r c r a f t and are los t only i f the a i r c r a f t i s l o s t . 
U n t i l recently a l l ac t ive countermeasures were considered non-expendable. 
However, recent advances in s o l i d s tate c i r c u i t r y and battery power 
sources have made i t feas ib le to develop expendable jammers ( 6 ) . 
The Problem 
Passive countermeasures have been ine f fec t ive when used against 
radars equipped with modern e lectronic counter-countermeasures (4 ,14) . 
The development of expendable jammers promises to regain the e f f e c t i v e ­
ness of expendable countermeasures. As more expendable countermeasures 
become a v a i l a b l e , the mission planner i s faced with the problem of 
deciding which of these countermeasures to carry on a given mission and 
the optimum locat ion at which to use them. Factors a f fect ing his dec i ­
sion include the capacity of the a i r c r a f t , the locat ion of the threat 
radars with respect to the mission route , and the character is t ics of 
the ind iv idual countermeasures. The ob jec t ive , or c r i t e r i o n , used in 
making th is decision i s usually re la ted to mission accomplishment and 
to the surv iva l of the penetrating a i r c r a f t . 
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The a v a i l a b i l i t y of expendable jammers has created a s imi lar 
problem for mi l i ta ry personnel who are responsible for the evaluation 
and procurement of countermeasures. In evaluating competing new designs 
or modifications of exist ing countermeasures, the primary factors to be 
considered are cost and operational e f fect iveness. The strategy used 
in deploying the countermeasures can greatly influence the i r e f f e c t i v e ­
ness . Therefore, the evaluator must determine the optimum timing and 
locat ion for dispensing the countermeasures being considered. I f such 
an optimum i s p r a c t i c a l to implement, then he should use i t as the 
deployment strategy i n his evaluat ion. A cost-ef fect iveness c r i t e r ion 
that has been used in comparative evaluations i s an expected cost 
expression which includes the determinist ic cost of the countermeasures 
and the operational effectiveness expressed as probabi l i ty of mission 
success (16) . 
Objectives 
The primary purpose of th is research i s to develop a procedure 
for determining optimum deployment strategies for expendable counter-
measures. A deployment strategy should specify the type and number of 
countermeasures to be dispensed at various points along a mission route. 
The c r i t e r i a to be optimized are re la ted to the problems discussed. In 
the mission planner's problem i t i s probabi l i ty of s u r v i v a l since a i r ­
cra f t s u r v i v a l and mission accomplishment are of primary concern. In 
the countermeasure evaluator 's problem cost-ef fect iveness i s the c r i ­
ter ion to be used since costs as w e l l as effect iveness are of primary 
importance. A mathematical model must be formulated to re la te the 
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parameters of the radar system with the var iables associated with the 
penetrating a i r c r a f t and i t s countermeasures. The technique for f inding 
the optimum strategy for use in a given mission w i l l be dynamic program­
ming. A computer program w i l l be developed and run for some example 
missions. 
L i tera ture Search 
Although there are many a r t i c l e s on models for weapon systems, 
there are few on employing expendable countermeasures because of the 
r e l a t i v e newness of the concept of expendables. Some of these a r t i c l e s 
and others which re la te to various aspects of the problem w i l l be d i s ­
cussed, along with an indicat ion of how they re la te to th is work. 
E lec t ron ic Countermeasures 
Descriptions of passive countermeasures can be found in r e f e r ­
ences by Skolnik (24 ) , Klass (12) and D i l Pare ( 6 ) . The common passive 
ECM devices are chaff and decoys. Chaff i s the oldest method of con­
fusing an enemy a i r c r a f t . I t consists of a large number of dipole 
r e f l e c t o r s , usually i n the form of meta l l ic f o i l s t r ips packaged as a 
bundle. After they are released by the a i r c r a f t , the f o i l s t r ips are 
scattered by the wind and form a highly r e f l e c t i n g cloud. A r e l a t i v e l y 
small bundle can form a cloud with a radar cross section comparable to 
that of a large a i r c r a f t . When a single bundle i s used i t creates a 
fa lse target and i s ca l led s p o t a h a f f . When an a i r c r a f t , or a forward 
f i r e d chaff rocket , continuously releases chaff , a cor r idor - l i ke cloud 
i s formed and any following a i r c r a f t that f l y through i t are masked on 
the radar much l i k e a smoke screen. Chaff deployed i n th is manner i s 
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ca l led c o v v i d o v c h a f f . Once the chaff i s in the atmosphere, i t s ve loc­
i t y i s due only to wind and grav i ty , thus i t i s a very slow moving ta r ­
get compared to an a i r c r a f t . Radar engineers recognized th is fact and 
designed moving target indicators to eliminate chaff from the operator's 
d isplay, making i t i n e f f e c t i v e . 
Decoys are small a i r c r a f t - l i k e vehicles f i t t e d with radar s ignal 
enhancement devices such as corner re f lec tors to make them appear as 
large as an a i r c r a f t on the radar display. They must have a power sup­
ply to give them a speed s imi lar to the speed of an a i r c r a f t . The power 
supply adds extra weight which l imi ts the number of decoys that can be 
carr ied conveniently. I t also makes them r e l a t i v e l y expensive, further 
l im i t ing t h e i r usefulness. 
Act ive countermeasures are discussed in references by Skolnik 
(24) , Klass (13) , Dax ( 4 ) , Holahan (11) , Kovit (14) , and Day ( 5 ) . 
Act ive jammers include noise jammers which seek to hide the target by 
saturat ing the radar receiver with noise and repeater jammers which 
create fa lse targets . 
Noise jammers usually radiate white Gaussian noise covering the 
bandwidth of the radar receiver to be jammed. Spot jammers radiate 
large amounts of energy on a r e l a t i v e l y narrow band and are highly 
e f fec t ive when radiat ing on the correct bandwidth. However, many modern 
radars have frequency " a g i l i t y " which allows them to change frequency 
rap id ly . Jammers that can radiate noise over a r e l a t i v e l y wide band of 
frequencies are b a v v a g e jammers. They usually can cover the ent i re 
tuning range of a par t icu lar class of radar t ransmit ters , thus rapidly 
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changing frequencies offers no r e l i e f from jamming. However, the power 
avai lable i s spread over a wide band resul t ing in less noise power 
within the radar receiver passband than i f the same power were radiated 
by a spot jammer. Sweepthrough jamming i s another way to jam over a 
frequency band wider than that of a spot jammer. The jammer "sweeps" 
the car r ie r frequency of a tunable transmitter over the radar band. 
Thus i t radiates large amounts of energy on each frequency for a very-
short period of time. The effect iveness of the sweepthrough jamming 
depends on obtaining a noise modulation in which the time taken by the 
sweeping car r ie r to traverse the receiver band i s approximately equal 
to the receiver response time. 
The ef fect of weak noise jamming i s to paint a single strobe on 
the face of the display at the azimuth angle of the jammer. As the 
power increases the strobe becomes wider and more strobes appear at 
d i f ferent azimuth angles. I f the jammer i s powerful enough the scope 
w i l l be completely blocked so that no targets appear. 
Repeater jammers generate fa lse echoes by delaying the received 
radar s ignal and retransmitt ing i t at a s l i g h t l y l a t e r t ime. The delay 
causes the repeated s ignal to appear at a range and/or azimuth di f ferent 
from that of the jammer. A transponder repeater plays back a stored 
rep l ica of the radar s ignal a f te r i t i s tr iggered by the radar. 
S . Kownacki (15) has proposed a method of u t i l i z i n g chaff and a 
transponder to create multiple moving targets . In the proposed method, 
chaff i s deposited i n the form of clumps, ejected backwards from the 
dispenser, with the r e l a t i v e ve loc i ty roughly equal to that of the true 
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veloc i ty of the dispenser. (This prevents i t from burning up i n a 
dense atmosphere.) I t i s then i r rad ia ted by an airborne transponder, 
located on the vehic le dispensing the chaff , so as to simulate desired 
radar echoes in range and Doppler, making returns indist inguishable 
from echoes from the a i r c r a f t . The transponder i s tr iggered by the 
pulses from the ground radar. This w i l l be one of the expendable 
countermeasures included in the set of countermeasures to be evaluated 
by the proposed procedure. 
Expendable jammers f i r s t appeared as decoys equipped with act ive 
repeaters to help enhance the radar s ignal (12) . Decoys were also 
equipped with small jammers to mimic jammers on the target a i r c r a f t in 
order to make them appear more r e a l i s t i c . D i l Pare (6) describes 
expendable jammers in d e t a i l in h is a r t i c l e . They may be dispersed by 
dropping them from a i r c r a f t , or from precursor missi les or rockets. 
They usually require parachutes to remain a lo f t a su f f i c ien t amount of 
t ime. However, i t i s possible to deploy expendables that radiate s i g ­
nals while on the ground or in t ree tops. Some expendable jammers 
radiate a noise-modulated or cw signal tuned to the radar 's frequency 
automatically. Others are pre-set pr ior to deployment. Often the 
parachute shrouds serve as the antenna for the expendable jammer. One 
d i f f i c u l t y D i l Pare mentions i s in developing an e f f i c i e n t power source 
that i s cheap enough to be considered expendable. The various d i s ­




In order to re la te the various parameters of the radar, a i r c r a f t 
and jammers, radar engineers have developed the radar equations. A 
widely referenced text which covers the basic theory behind the equations 
has been wr i t ten by Skolnik (24) . The s ignal power obtained by a 
receiving system from re f lec ted energy i s 
S = C r r (1-1) 1 (4tt) V 
where 
S = power at receiver emanating from radar transmitter . 
= generated radar power. 
G = radar antenna gain, r 
A = receiver center frequency wave length. 
a = e f fec t ive radar target radar cross sect ion. 
R = range from radar to target . 
= constant that includes radar losses and s ignal processing 
gain. 
The power obtained by the receiver from a jammer i s 
J = c 2 
p.g .g 'a 2 b 
] ] r : r (1-2) 2 2 
(4-tt) RTB. 
where 
J = power at receiver emanating from jamming source. 
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P . = g e n e r a t e d jamming p o w e r . 
G_. = t ransmit a n t e n n a g a i n o f jammer. 
G' = r e c e i v e r a n t e n n a g a i n , a n t e n n a ( m a i n o r s i d e ) l o b e r e c e i v i n g 
jammer s i g n a l . 
B = r e c e i v e r b a n d w i d t h , r 
B . = jammer b a n d w i d t h . 
R. = r a n g e from jammer a n t e n n a t o r e c e i v i n g a n t e n n a . 
Cg = c o n s t a n t t h a t i n c l u d e s l o s s e s i n t h e jammer and t h e r e c e i v e r . 
The p a r a m e t e r s t o b e u s e d i n t h i s r e s e a r c h w i l l b e d e s c r i b e d i n g r e a t e r 
d e t a i l i n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r . 
F r i e d m a n ( 9 ) s h o w s how t h e e q u a t i o n s f o r J and S can b e c o m b i n e d 
t o f o r m a s i g n a l - t o - n o i s e r a t i o ( S N R ) . He d e f i n e s SNR a s t h e r a t i o o f 
i n f o r m a t i o n c a r r y i n g s i g n a l t o n o i s e f rom w h i c h i n t e l l i g e n c e can b e 
e x t r a c t e d . B a s e d upon t h e SNR, a t h r e s h o l d i s e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e 
r e c e i v e r o u t p u t . The s i g n a l - p l u s - n o i s e e n e r g y mus t e x c e e d t h i s t h r e s h ­
o l d f o r t h e s i g n a l t o b e d e t e c t e d . I f t h e n o i s e a l o n e e x c e e d s t h i s 
t h r e s h o l d , a f a l s e a l a r m r e s u l t s . For a g i v e n f a l s e a l a r m r a t e t h e SNR 
c a n b e r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y t o p r o b a b i l i t y o f d e t e c t i o n . 
R e c e i v e r o u t p u t n o i s e p o w e r i s d e f i n e d a s N w h e r e 
N = KT B . ( 1 - 3 ) e r 
N o i s e p o w e r i s i d e n t i f i e d a s a n t e n n a and a m p l i f i e r n o i s e a s w e l l a s 
u s u a l s y s t e m l o s s e s . I t i s c u s t o m a r y t o r e f e r e n c e s u c h r e c e i v e r n o i s e 
t o T , t h e e f f e c t i v e n o i s e t e m p e r a t u r e o f t h e r e c e i v i n g s y s t e m . K i s 
B o l t z m a n n ' s c o n s t a n t . 
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I n t h e p r e s e n c e o f jamming S N R i s 
S N R 
S N R = 
s i g n a l 
s e l f n o i s e + jamming 
N + J 
2 2 P G A c r r 
S N R = 
KT B + C o l e r 21 
P . G . G ' X 2 B 
3 3 * r ( 4 T T ) 2 R ? B . 
: i j 
( 1 - 4 ) 
I n a c o r r e c t i o n t o F r i e d m a n ' s a r t i c l e , M i a m i d i a n ( 1 9 ) s h o w s t h a t 
f o r N jammers 
S N R = 
2 2 P G X o r r 
( 4 T T ) 3 R ^ 
X 2 B 





n = l 
P . G. G' C 0 
j n j n r n 2n 
R 2 B . 
( 1 - 5 ) 
F r i e d m a n n o t e s t h a t t h e S N R e q u a t i o n s may b e s i m p l i f i e d f o r o t h e r t h a n 
maximum r a n g e t a r g e t l o c a t i o n s . To c a l c u l a t e t h e r e q u i r e d jamming p o w e r 
t o s c r e e n a t a r g e t n o t n e a r r a d a r maximum r a n g e , t h e r a d a r r e c e i v e r 
s e l f - n o i s e , KT B may b e n e g l e c t e d , e r 
A n o t h e r r e f e r e n c e w h i c h d i s c u s s e s r a d a r e q u a t i o n s i s B a r t o n ' s 
a r t i c l e ( 1 ) . He d e r i v e s r a d a r e q u a t i o n s t o c a l c u l a t e t h e p e r f o r m a n c e 
11 
of radar in a c lu t te r environment such as chaff. Chaff i s a passive 
countermeasure that i s r e l a t i v e l y easy to counter with ECCM. Thus i t 
w i l l not be included in the model formulated in th is t h e s i s . The equa­
t ions derived by Barton make i t easy to extend the model to include 
chaff. 
Evaluating Expendable Countermeasures 
In a recent t h e s i s , La Force (16) developed a general methodology 
to be used in the comparative evaluation of expendable countermeasures. 
From a comparison, the optimal mix of countermeasures to be carr ied on 
a par t icu lar mission can be selected. The decision c r i te r ion on which 
the select ion i s based i s cost -e f fect iveness. 
The measure of cost-effect iveness used is the expected cost 
resul t ing from the use of the par t icu lar mix of countermeasures under 
consideration. The expected cost i s defined as the sum of a deter­
min is t ic cost and a stochast ic cost. The determinist ic cost i s the cost 
of the countermeasures used in the mission. The stochast ic cost are 
determined by defining possible outcomes of the mission and assigning 
cost to these outcomes. These costs are then weighted by the probabi l i ­
t i e s of the respective outcomes resul t ing from the use of the counter-
measures being evaluated. Summing these weighted costs y ie lds the 
stochastic portion of the expected cost . 
This research w i l l make use of that cost-ef fect iveness c r i t e r i o n . 
However, the outcomes used w i l l not be the same as those used by 
La Force. The outcomes used in th is thesis are mission success and 
mission f a i l u r e . The mission i s considered a success i f the penetrator 
survives the mission, otherwise i t i s a f a i l u r e . 
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In his work La Force uses integer programming to determine the 
optimum a i r c r a f t load for various mixes of countermeasures. He then 
discusses the importance of using an optimum strategy i n deploying the 
countermeasures. He suggests that a set of strategies be speci f ied 
and an evaluation be conducted using each strategy with each mix of 
countermeasures. C lear ly , the number of evaluations conducted w i l l 
increase very rapidly when using that procedure. This work w i l l show 
how dynamic programming can be used to determine the optimum deployment 
strategy and optimum a i r c r a f t load with regard to probabi l i ty of suc­
cess. This probabi l i ty of success could then be used i n La Force's 
procedure to determine the most cost -e f fec t ive set of countermeasures. 
However, i t w i l l be shown that an a l te rnat ive formulation of the dynamic 
programming procedure can be used to obtain th is resu l t d i r e c t l y . 
La Force suggests using computer simulation as the technique to 
determine the probabi l i t ies associated with the outcomes. He concludes 
that i t may be the only technique avai lable that can handle the many 
parameters which must be considered. He states that due to the high 
expense involved in a simulation study i t i s important to obtain as 
much information as possible from pre-simulation studies. One applica­
t ion of the procedure developed in th is research would be to determine 
the deployment strategy to be used in a detai led simulation study. 
Fukuda et a l . (10) consider an expendable countermeasure problem 
in a s l i g h t l y di f ferent context. Their penetrator i s a b a l l i s t i c mis­
s i l e warhead and the i r countermeasures are decoys. The objective i s to 
enhance s u r v i v a b i l i t y of the warheads against terminal defenses. The 
number and size of decoys that can be carr ied in a missi le payload i s 
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subject to constraints. The effectiveness of the decoys depends on 
the i r s ize (compared to the warhead) and the number used. The strategy 
of the offense i s a select ion of a decoy spec i f ica t ion which, under 
size and weight constra ints , uniquely determines the number, say N, of 
decoys to be contained in a missi le payload together with a f ixed number, 
say K (possibly greater than one), of warheads. The problem i s viewed 
as a game of strategy between the offense and the defense and dynamic 
programming is used to f ind the optimal s t ra teg ies . 
In determining the probabi l i t ies of s u r v i v a l of the warhead, they 
consider a cloud of L = K + N objects which i s subjected to defense 
act ion. The defense correct ly iden t i f i es a warhead and k i l l s i t with 
probabi l i ty , P . The probabi l i ty of surv iva l i s given by: 
r ( 1 - V - ( 1 - 6 ) 
A s imi lar expression i s used in th is thesis when dealing with decoys. 
Brodheim et a l . (3) have developed a general model of a i r defense/ 
offense interact ion on a basis of a dynamic program. The attacking force 
consists of a i r c r a f t , t a c t i c a l missi les or ICBM's, and the defense system 
consists of control centers and interceptor miss i les . The object ive of 
the offensive force i s to destroy a given set of targets with the least 
possible cost. The defense object ive i s to maximize the offensive cost 
of an attack. Hence, the measure of effectiveness they use i s the 
expected value of the t o t a l cost of an attack. One appl icat ion suggested 
i s to determine the effectiveness of using decoys during various stages 
14 
o f t h e a t t a c k . S i n c e t h e i r a t t a c k s a r e r e p e a t e d m i s s i o n s u n t i l t h e t a r ­
g e t i s d e s t r o y e d o r u n t i l t h e d e f e n s e r u n s o u t o f w e a p o n s , i t c a n n o t b e 
a p p l i e d t o t h e p r o b l e m c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s r e p o r t . 
T a c t i c s S e l e c t i o n 
F a w c e t t ( 8 ) a p p l i e s d y n a m i c programming and some n o t i o n s i n d e c i ­
s i o n t h e o r y t o t h e p r o b l e m o f making a r a t i o n a l s e l e c t i o n o f t a c t i c s f o r 
an a i r - t o - g r o u n d a t t a c k when f a c e d w i t h u n c e r t a i n t y . I n h i s work h e 
d i s c u s s e s a u s e r p r o b l e m and a weapon s y s t e m d e s i g n e r ' s p r o b l e m t h a t a r e 
s i m i l a r t o o u r m i s s i o n p l a n n e r ' s p r o b l e m and c o u n t e r m e a s u r e e v a l u a t o r ' s 
p r o b l e m . He r e l a t e s t h e u s e r and d e s i g n e r p r o b l e m s b y c o n s i d e r i n g them 
a s p a r t s o f a t w o s t a g e d e c i s i o n p r o b l e m . The d e s i g n e r ' s d e c i s i o n s a r e 
t h o s e t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e weapon s y s t e m . The 
u s e r ' s d e c i s i o n s a r e d e p i c t e d a s s e c o n d s t a g e d e c i s i o n s t h a t a r e made 
s u b j e c t t o c o n s t r a i n t s i m p o s e d by t h e s y s t e m d e s i g n . When e v a l u a t i n g 
t h e o p e r a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e v a r i o u s d e s i g n s , t h e d e s i g n e r must 
c o n s i d e r t h e s e c o n d s t a g e d e c i s i o n s . T h e s e d e c i s i o n s a r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h 
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e b e s t t a c t i c ( s t r a t e g y ) f o r a g i v e n d e s i g n i n a p a r t i c u ­
l a r s i t u a t i o n . T h a t , h e n o t e s , c a n b e a m a j o r c o n s t r a i n e d o p t i m i z a t i o n 
p r o b l e m w h e r e t h e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n and c o n s t r a i n t s must b e c a r e f u l l y 
f o r m u l a t e d . He c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e t a c t i c s o p t i m i z a t i o n p r o b l e m s e e m s t o 
b e i n s e p a r a b l e from t h e d e s i g n e v a l u a t i o n p r o b l e m w h e n e v e r t h e u s e r h a s 
some l a t i t u d e o f c h o i c e a s t o t h e manner o f s y s t e m e m p l o y m e n t . T h i s 
t h e n p r o v i d e s t h e p r i m a r y m o t i v a t i o n f o r d e t e r m i n i n g t h e o p t i m a l d e p l o y ­
ment s t r a t e g y f o r e x p e n d a b l e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s . 
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Dynamic Programming 
In the problems considered, sequential decisons must be made con­
cerning how many countermeasures of a certain type to a l locate along each 
section of the f l i g h t route. The number of countermeasures ava i lab le i s 
l imi ted by the capacity of the a i r c r a f t . Each a l locat ion i s considered 
to have a given ef fect on an objective function which i s to be optimized. 
Dynamic programming i s a very powerful approach to solving th is type 
problem. 
Bellman (2) invented the name dynamic programming and developed 
much of the theory behind the technique. His "pr inciple of optimality" 
i s the s tar t ing point for developing the recursive relat ionships which 
make i t possible to convert a sequential decision process containing 
many var iables into a ser ies of single-stage problems containing only 
a few var iab les . Stated in his words, "An optimal pol icy has the 
property that whatever the i n i t i a l state and decisions a re , the remain­
ing decisions must constitute an optimal pol icy with regard to the state 
resul t ing from the f i r s t dec is ion." 
In his tex t , Numhauser (21) discusses the techniques for apply­
ing the pr inc ip le of optimality to solve sequential decision problems. 
He develops recursive relat ionships using s e r i a l multi-stage decision 
systems. He defines such a system as "a set of stages joined together 
in ser ies so that the output of one stage becomes the input to the next 
s tage." (See Figure 1.) In order to have the optimal return as the 
function of the i n i t i a l s t a t e , , calculat ions are done by a "backward" 










n - l n 1 
1 
Figure 1 . Diagram of Multi-Stage Process 
For the general stage n ( n = l , 2 } . . . } N ) of the N-stage system the 
state of the system i s completely described by the state vector X^. The 
decision made at that stage i s designated by the decision vector D̂  the 
stage transformation i s 
X = t (X ,D ) n - l n n n (1-7) 
and the stage return i s 
r = r (X ,D ) n n n n (1-8) 
Denoting f^tX^) as the maximum N-stage return we have N N 
W = m a x n ^ V W ' W k ' W r i ( x i ' V ] ( 1 " 9 ) 
subject to 
X = t (X 9D ) n = 1 , . . . ,N . 
n - l n n 5 n 
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In order to develop the recursive r e l a t i o n s , we must be able to 
decompose a general function g as given in Equation (1-9) so that the 
maximization with respect to DrT ,D_, can be moved inside the N-stage 
r N-1 1 & 
return. A su f f i c ien t condition for making the important change in the 
posit ion of the maximization has been given by Mitten (20) . Nemhauser 
(21) c a l l s i t the monotonicity condit ion. I f the function g s a t i s f i e s 
the monotonicity condition and a condition he c a l l s separability 3 i t can 
be decomposed. The conditions Nemhauser requires are given. I f 
1 . Separability 
(1-10) 
where g and g 9 are r e a l valued funct ions, and 
2. Monotonicity 
g i s a monotonically nondecreasing function of g 9 for every r 
Then 
3 . Decomposition 
max S [ V XN >V ' BM - l ( V l ' D N - 1 } ' ' * * > P 1 ( Xl ' V ] ( 
1 
= max g x r ^ X ^ . D ^ , 
D, 
m X g 2 C r N - l ( X N - l ' D N - l ) ' " - - ' r l ( X l ' D l ) : ] } 
N N-1 
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I t i s eas i ly shown that i f the t o t a l return function i s a sura of 
the indiv idual stage returns or a product of the stage returns where the 
stage returns are non-negative r e a l numbers, then the problem can be 
decomposed. 
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CHAPTER I I 
THE SCENARIO MODEL 
General 
The purpose of th is chapter i s to discuss the formulation of the 
model to be used to calculate the probabi l i ty of surv iva l of the pene­
t ra t ing a i r c r a f t . A more detai led description of the problem w i l l be 
presented. A modified version of the s ignal - to-noise r a t i o equation 
(1-5) forms an important part of the model. The parameters of th is 
equation and the i r relat ionship to the model w i l l be described. Assump­
tions that are made to l i m i t the complexity of the model w i l l be d i s ­
cussed. The model developed w i l l not be a complex one since i t s primary 
purpose i s to aid in demonstrating the procedure for se lect ing the 
optimum deployment strategy. However, the discussion presented here 
w i l l indicate how the model can be enlarged. 
T a c t i c a l Missions 
The Penetrating Force 
Tac t i ca l missions over enemy held t e r r i t o r y have one or more of 
three goals , a i r - s u p e r i o r i t y , i n t e r d i c t i o n , or reconnaissance. On an 
a i r -super io r i ty mission the penetrating a i r c r a f t e i ther attempt to 
engage enemy interceptor a i r c r a f t i n the a i r , or they have a s p e c i f i c 
target that i s part of the a i r defense system such as a i r f i e l d s , missi le 
s i t e s , or radars. The targets in in terd ic t ion missions are l ines of 
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communication or supply routes. On a reconnaissance mission the objec­
t i v e i s to obtain information concerning the locat ion of enemy i n s t a l l a ­
tions and troops. A specia l type of reconnaissance mission i s an e t i n t 
mission (17,18). Here the goal i s to obtain e lectronic in te l l igence 
concerning enemy radar loca t ions , range, and s ignal charac te r is t i cs . 
This information i s then used in the planning of countermeasure employ­
ment for future missions. 
Since the t a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t usually have s p e c i f i c targets they 
plan t h e i r mission routes in advance. Modern navigat ional equipment 
and control from fr iendly radar makes i t possible for the a i r c r a f t to 
stay on route , locate the ta rge t , and often avoid enemy weapons. Thus, 
in th is model a f ixed a i r c r a f t f l i g h t route and a l t i tude w i l l be used. 
I t i s assumed that the penetrator knows the posit ion of enemy radars 
with respect to th is route. E l i n t a i r c r a f t , s a t e l l i t e s and other new 
equipment designed for pinpointing the locat ion of enemy radar make th is 
feas ib le . 
For a i r -super io r i ty and in terd ic t ion missions several a i r c r a f t 
are generally employed. For reconnaissance missions generally only a 
single a i r c r a f t i s required although i t may be escorted by a f ighter 
for protect ion. Whenever more than one a i r c r a f t i s used on a mission, 
they f l y in close formation u n t i l the target i s engaged. At th is time 
they are often at low a l t i tude and out of radar coverage i f the target 
i s not a radar s i t e . While f l y i n g in close formation several a i r c r a f t 
usually appear as a single target on radar displays unless they are very 
close to the radar s i t e . For th is reason i t i s assumed that a single 
penetrating a i r c r a f t i s used in the development of th is model. 
21 
Examination of the SNR equation (1-5) shows that the only param­
eters associated with the a i r c r a f t are range of the a i r c r a f t from the 
radar and the a i r c r a f t ' s radar cross section a. Both of these w i l l 
be var iables in the model. Range i s a common term that does not need 
explanation. Radar cross section provides a measure of the e f fec t ive 
a i r c r a f t echoing area. I t i s defined as that equivalent area which 
would intercept the radar s ignal and, i f scattered equally i n a l l 
d i rec t ions , produce an echo at the radar equal to that received from 
the target . I t i s dependent on the aspect angle from which the target 
i s viewed as w e l l as the radar frequency. I t i s a product of the 
i l luminated surface area and the r e f l e c t i v i t y of that area. For com­
plex ta rge ts , such as moving a i r c r a f t , these parameters vary continu­
ously, making analysis d i f f i c u l t . Thus, in the calculat ions only 
equivalent nominal values of radar cross section w i l l be used. 
The Radar System 
The defensive systems encountered by t a c t i c a l a i r forces are 
generally not as complex as the systems encountered by s t ra teg ic a i r 
forces. Several factors contribute to t h i s . T a c t i c a l forces are usually 
not employed u n t i l large portions of the defensive system have been de­
stroyed by the s t ra teg ic forces. Reconnaissance and in terd ic t ion mis­
sions do not require deep penetration into enemy t e r r i t o r y . Thus they 
encounter only the border defense system. Tac t i ca l missions are also 
used extensively i n l imi ted wars where the opposing forces do not have 
the technology to bui ld and operate complex systems. 
The defensive system considered in th is thesis w i l l be a s ingle 
sur face - to -a i r missi le s i t e with i t s associated radar. A l l of the 
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parameters associated with the radar and missi les are assumed to be 
known. The radar parameters are the power radiate P , radar antenna gain 
G , receiver antenna gain G T , receiver bandwidth B and the radar f r e -r to r r 
quency A. In the model the values of these terms w i l l be constants and 
w i l l appear only i n a general constant term. The missi le parameters 
include range of the m i s s i l e , probabi l i ty of missi le k i l l , and the num­
ber of missi les that can be control led at the same time. The probabi l ­
i t y of missi le k i l l w i l l be assumed to be a function of the target 
range. I t w i l l be assumed that the missi le s i t e can control only one 
missi le at a time. 
From Equation (1-2) i t i s seen that only the receiver bandwidth 
and receiver antenna gain ef fect the power received from the jammer. 
The bandwidth appears i n the r a t i o B / B . and i s used to accommodate the 
analysis of jammer spectra that exceed receiver bandwidth. The rece iver 
antenna gain term represents gain from the main beam or sidelobes. When 
expendable jammers are deployed in close proximity to the radar , s ide -
lobe jamming becomes important and must be included in the model. 
Radars use d i rec t ive antennas for transmission and reception. On 
transmission the d i rec t ive antenna channels the radiated energy into a 
beam to enhance the energy concentrated in the d i rect ion of the a i r ­
c r a f t . A measure of the a b i l i t y of an antenna to concentrate energy 
in a par t icu la r d irect ion i s ca l led the gain. Two d i f f e ren t , but re la ted 
def in i t ions of antenna gain are the d i rec t ive gain and the power gain. 
The d i rec t ive gain i s descr ipt ive of the antenna pat tern , but the power 
gain i s more appropriate for use as a value in radar equations. 
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The power gain G^ is a measure of the power radiated in a par­
t i c u l a r d i rect ion by a d i rec t ive antenna to the power which would have 
been radiated in the same direct ion by an omnidirectional antenna with 
100 per cent e f f i c iency . I t i s proportional to the area of the antenna 
In the model i t w i l l be a constant. 
The antenna pattern i s a plot of the antenna gain as a function 
of the d i rect ion of rad ia t ion . A t y p i c a l antenna pattern has the shape 
of s in X/X curve as shown in Figure 2. 
-5 ° 0° 5° 10° 15° 2 0° 2 5° 
Degrees Off Axis 
Figure 2. Antenna Radiation Pattern 
The pattern has a main beam or lobe which carr ies the s ignal that i s of 
primary in terest and sidelobes that are radiated energy which i s not 
properly d i rected. Values of receiver sidelobe antenna gain are f r e ­
quently d i f f i c u l t to obtain. The antenna pattern may be unknown and 
even when i t i s known i t has nu l ls and widely-varying sidelobes. The 
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absolute sidelobe gain can vary with e leva t ion , azimuth, frequency and 
mode of operation. Consequently a nominal average value of sidelobe 
gain i s generally used. This may be approximated by 
G; =
 G- 2 ( 2" 1 } 
i + (e.-eY i t 
where (6. -6 ) i s the angle between the jammer and a i r c r a f t in degrees.^" 
This i s an approximation to the s in X/X shaped curve the radar pattern 
often resembles and i s shown as the smooth curve on Figure 2. 
Another charac ter is t ic of the antenna pattern i s the shape of the 
main beam. Antenna beam shapes most commonly employed in radar are the 
penci l beam and the fan beam. The penci l beam i s approximately ax ia l l y 
symmetric and has a beam width of a few degrees or l e s s . I t i s commonly 
used in target tracking radars where i t i s necessary to measure cont in­
uously the angular posit ion of a single target in both azimuth and e l e ­
vat ion . The fan beam i s broad in one dimension and narrow in the other. 
For example, a long-range search radar may have a beamwidth of 1° in 
azimuth and 60° in e levat ion . The beamwidth determines the number of 
angular resolut ion c e l l s that must be scanned in order for a radar to 
cover cer ta in regions. I f the search radar i s required to give complete 
c i rcu la r coverage, i t must scan 360° in azimuth. The scanning region 
may be considered as being divided into 360 azimuth resolut ion c e l l s of 
"^This approximation was suggested to the author by Mr. Ron P e a r l , 
Radar Branch of the E lec t ron ic Engineering S t a t i o n , Georgia I n s t i t u t e of 
Technology. 
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1° each. When using expendable jammers of r e l a t i v e l y low power, a 
minimum number i s usually needed in each azimuth resolut ion c e l l to 
properly screen the a i r c r a f t . Thus the number of resolut ion c e l l s , 
and hence the beamwidth, af fect the number of jammers required. 
An important set of parameters that should be included i n a 
detai led model of a defense system are the parameters re la ted to the 
radar operators. These parameters include the manner i n which the 
operators u t i l i z e avai lable equipment, and the various communications 
passing between the operators. A model that includes a l l of these 
parameters would be a rather complex model such as a simulation model. 
The model w i l l consider only the operator's decision to f i r e a miss i l e . 
The Countermeasures 
The countermeasures ava i lab le for use by t a c t i c a l a i r forces 
include those in the expendable and non-expendable c lasses. When 
employing non-expendable countermeasures, or on-board jammers as they 
are usually c a l l e d , r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e preplanning i s required. They 
can be used at any time during the mission, and the decision to use 
them i s often based on detecting the host i le radar s ignal (11) . I t i s 
ant ic ipated that e f fec t ive employment of expendable countermeasures 
requires preplanning. The number and type of countermeasures that are 
to be used should be known pr ior to the mission in order to load the 
a i r c r a f t . A deployment strategy i s needed to prevent inadvertently 
using a l l the countermeasures during an encounter at the beginning of 
the mission. A plan i s needed to aid the p i l o t in se lect ing the correct 
time and direct ion to f i r e any precursor rockets or missi les that are 
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used to disperse the countermeasures. I t should be noted that th is 
preplanning may require accurate in te l l igence on the enemy defensive 
system, and a f ixed mission route. 
From the SNR equations i t i s seen that the parameters associated 
with the jammers include the power of the jammer P . , jammer antenna gain 
G . , range of the jammer R_. and jammer bandwidth B_. . Personnel respon­
s ib le for evaluating new countermeasure designs would be interested i n 
comparing the cost-ef fect iveness of various changes in any of these 
parameters. For example, a new design may require a se lect ion from 
several d i f ferent antennas. They may vary i n p r i c e , s i z e , and antenna 
gain. In order to evaluate the e f fec t iveness , the model would need a 
var iable for antenna gain. However, from the viewpoint of the mission 
planner the antenna gain and bandwidth w i l l be f ixed by the designs 
a v a i l a b l e . He w i l l be able to vary only the jammer range from the radar 
by se lect ing di f ferent del ivery techniques, and the power by se lect ing 
the number to be deployed. In formulating the model, the jammer anten­
na gain and bandwidth w i l l be considered constants and included in a 
common constant term. This w i l l allow the demonstration of the proce­
dure for both the mission planner's problem and the evaluator 's problem 
to be accomplished with a less complex model. 
The power of the jammer used i s an important va r i ab le . I n Equa­
t ion ( 1 - 5 ) , the power received at the radar from the jammers i s a sum 
of the powers of the ind iv idua l jammers. Thus increasing the numbers of 
jammers deployed in a cer ta in locat ion increases the power. Also Equa­
t ion (2-1) indicates that the jammers deployed in several consecutive 
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azimuth resolut ion c e l l s contribute to the t o t a l power received by the 
radar. The power radiated by the indiv idual jammer i s l imi ted by i t s 
size and i t s power source. The number that can be used i s r e s t r i c t e d 
by the capacity of the a i r c r a f t or the dispenser employed to disperse 
the countermeasures. 
The jammer range i s also an important var iab le . I t i s influenced 
primari ly by the del ivery method. From Equations (1-1) and ( 1 - 2 ) , i t 
can be seen that the jammer power at the radar var ies inversely as the 
square of the distance between the radar and jammer while the radar echo 
power var ies with distance inversely as the fourth power. Thus, for 
expendable jammers dispersed d i rec t ly from the a i r c r a f t (and for on­
board jammers), there w i l l always be some distance below which the radar 
echo w i l l be larger than the jammer s i g n a l . This i s ca l led the s e l f -
screening range or the b u m - t h r o u g h range. Dispersing the jammers 
d i rec t ly from the a i r c r a f t w i l l require a large number of jammers 
because the a i r c r a f t and jammers separate rapidly due to the a i r c r a f t 
speed. Hence, other dispersion techniques appear superior. 
From the SNR equations, the range of the jammer var ies d i rec t ly 
as a square term. Thus, the s ignal - to-noise r a t i o and the probabi l i ty 
of detection w i l l be lowered by deploying the jammers closer to the 
radar. However, the range from the radar at which the jammers can be 
deployed depends on the accuracy of the dispenser and the p i l o t ' s 
knowledge of the exact locat ion of the radar with respect to h is a i r ­
c r a f t . To be of use, the jammer must be located between the radar and 
the a i r c r a f t . For a precursor rocket or missi le dispenser, a known 
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c i rcu la r miss distance i s assumed. From th is miss distance, an average 
range from the radar can be found, such that the jammer w i l l be on the 
correct side of the radar with a very high probabi l i ty . This average 
range w i l l be used i n the model as the range of the jammers from the 
radar. 
The Model 
Probabi l i ty of Detection 
In Chapter I i t was noted that the probabi l i ty of a detection of 
an a i r c r a f t by a radar i s re lated to the s ignal - to-noise r a t i o . In 
order to calculate the probabi l i ty of detection A, a modified form of 
the SNR Equation (1-5) w i l l be used. The expression for s e l f no ise , 
KT^B_^, i s dropped since i t i s needed only near maximum range. The terms 
P , A, G , G' B and B . are considered as constants as discussed in the r r r r ] 
previous sect ions. They and the constants C^ and C^ form a new constant 
C. The expression given by Equation (2-1) i s used for G_̂  and the signal-
. 2 
to-noise r a t i o for our model i s 





1 + ( 
(2-2) 
This equation was suggested to the author by Mr. Ron P e a r l , 
Radar Branch E lec t ron ic Engineering S t a t i o n , Georgia I n s t i t u t e of 
Technology. 
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For th is thesis the probabi l i ty of detection w i l l be assumed to be d i ­
rec t l y proportional to the s ignal - to-noise r a t i o . The probabi l i ty of 
detection of an a i r c r a f t using N expendable jammers i s 
A = 
' (SNR)-C' for (SNR)-C'<1 
1 for (SNR)-C>1 
(2-3) 
where C i s a constant. 
Probabi l i ty of A i rc ra f t Loss 
The probabi l i ty of the a i r c r a f t being destroyed L i s dependent 
on the probabi l i ty of detect ion, tracking error and the probabi l i ty of 
the missi le destroying the a i r c r a f t . The tracking error w i l l also be 
considered dependent on the probabi l i ty of detect ion. When the proba­
b i l i t y of detection i s smal l , the tracking error w i l l be l a r g e , i f the 
a i r c r a f t i s being tracked at a l l . When the probabi l i ty of detection i s 
high, the tracking error w i l l be smal l . A threshold of the probabi l i ty 
of detection A' w i l l be used to determine whether the operator i s t rack­
ing the target w e l l enough to f i r e a m i s s i l e . For example, i f A' = 0 .5 , 
then the probabi l i ty of detection must be greater than 0.5 for a missi le 
to be f i r e d . 
The probabi l i ty of the missi le destroying the a i r c r a f t once i t 
i s f i r e d w i l l be a function of the range of the a i r c r a f t . I t w i l l be 
expressed as an equation or read into the computer as a tab le . For 
example, i f the maximum missi le range i s 39 mi les , the probabi l i ty of 
the m i s s i l e ' s destroying the a i r c r a f t at a range greater than 39 miles 
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would be zero. Assuming the probabi l i ty of the miss i l e ' s destroying the 
a i r c r a f t at very close range to be 0.4, and the probabi l i ty for other 
ranges as being d i rec t ly proportional to the distance from the radar, 
the equation for probabi l i ty of missi le k i l l M w i l l then be 
R 
0.4 - f o r 
M = s (2-4) 
0 for Rt>40 
The probabi l i ty of the a i r c r a f t being destroyed w i l l increase 
as the tracking error decreases, or as the probabi l i ty of detection i n ­
creases. I t w i l l be expressed as a product of the probabi l i ty of detec­
t ion and the probabi l i ty of missi le k i l l . Using the probabi l i ty of 
missi le k i l l from th is example, the probabi l i ty of a i r c r a f t loss can be 
expressed as 
L = < 
A*M for A>A', Rt<40 
(2-5) 
0 otherwise. 
After the missi le i s f i r e d , a period of time w i l l elapse while the 
missi le t rave ls to the target . In th is period of time the a i r c r a f t w i l l 
also t r a v e l a cer ta in distance. I t can be seen from Equation (2) that 
the probabi l i ty of detection w i l l vary during the t r a v e l time. There­
f o r e , we w i l l use an average probabi l i ty of detection for A i n Equation 
(2 -5 ) . 
3 1 
When t h e e x p e n d a b l e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e i s c h a f f i r r a d i a t e d b y a 
t r a n s p o n d e r , a d i f f e r e n t e x p r e s s i o n i s n e e d e d f o r p r o b a b i l i t y o f a i r ­
c r a f t l o s s . The r a d a r w i l l d e t e c t n m o v i n g t a r g e t s due t o t h e c h a f f 
and o n e due t o t h e a i r c r a f t . I f t h e s e n + l m o v i n g t a r g e t s c a n n o t b e 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y t h e r a d a r o p e r a t o r , t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g t h e 
a i r c r a f t c o r r e c t l y w i l l b e • -̂ ^ . The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e a i r c r a f t 
b e i n g d e s t r o y e d w i l l b e a p r o d u c t o f t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g t h e 
c o r r e c t t a r g e t and t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f m i s s i l e k i l l . T h a t i s 
L = M • - - i - T . ( 2 - 6 ) n + l 
T h i s e x p r e s s i o n i s a n a l o g o u s t o E q u a t i o n ( 1 - 6 ) . 
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CHAPTER I I I 
SELECTING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY 
General 
In th is chapter a procedure to determine optimal deployment 
strategies for the countermeasures w i l l be presented. A mathematical 
formulation of both the mission planner's problem and the counter-
measure evaluator 's problem w i l l be described. The solut ion procedure 
used to solve these problems w i l l make use of the model developed in 
the previous chapter. 
Application of the Model 
The scenario model can be used to determine the probabi l i ty of 
a i r c r a f t loss at d i f ferent locations along the f l i g h t route. In order 
to ca lculate the probabi l i ty that the a i r c r a f t survives the mission, 
the f l i g h t route must be divided into sect ions. The probabi l i ty of 
a i r c r a f t loss i s then calculated for each section of the route and 
these probabi l i t ies are combined to form the probabi l i ty of a i r c r a f t 
surviv ing the mission or probabi l i ty of success as i t was defined in 
Chapter I . 
Se lect ing the length of the sections of the f l i g h t route can be 
a problem. I f they are very long, the average probabi l i ty of detection 
used in the model may be exceedingly d i f ferent from that at various 
points along the sect ion . Also the number of missi les that could be 
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f i r e d may b e g r e a t e r t h a n o n e , r e q u i r i n g a s l i g h t m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e 
m o d e l . I f t h e y a r e s h o r t e r t h a n t h e a i r c r a f t t r a v e l d i s t a n c e d e t e r m i n e d 
from m i s s i l e f l i g h t t i m e , u s i n g t h e m o d e l c o u l d r e s u l t i n h a v i n g more 
m i s s i l e s b e i n g f i r e d t h a n i s a c t u a l l y p o s s i b l e . The l e n g t h o f t h e s e c ­
t i o n s u s e d i n t h i s r e p o r t w i l l b e d e t e r m i n e d from t h e a i r c r a f t t r a v e l 
d i s t a n c e b a s e d on t h e t i m e i t t a k e s f o r a m i s s i l e s i t e t o l o c k - o n , f i r e , 
and g u i d e a m i s s i l e t o a t a r g e t a t maximum m i s s i l e r a n g e . I t i s a l s o 
a s s u m e d t h a t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a i r c r a f t l o s s o b t a i n e d from t h e s e c t i o n s 
o f t h i s l e n g t h i s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e o t h e r s e c t i o n s . 
M i s s i o n P l a n n e r ' s P r o b l e m 
M a t h e m a t i c a l F o r m u l a t i o n 
The p r o b l e m f a c i n g t h e m i s s i o n p l a n n e r i s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e o p t i m a l 
c o u n t e r m e a s u r e d e p l o y m e n t s t r a t e g y t h a t g i v e s maximum p r o b a b i l i t y o f a i r ­
c r a f t s u r v i v a l . The m i s s i o n r o u t e w i l l b e d i v i d e d i n t o N s e c t i o n s o f 
e q u a l l e n g t h . At e a c h o f t h e s e c t i o n s t h e m i s s i o n p l a n n e r can d e p l o y a 
number and t y p e o f c o u n t e r m e a s u r e r e s u l t i n g i n a p r o b a b i l i t y o f a i r c r a f t 
l o s s f o r t h a t s e c t i o n . The t o t a l number o f c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s u s e d i n t h e 
m i s s i o n i s l i m i t e d by t h e a v a i l a b l e c a p a c i t y o f t h e a i r c r a f t . 
L e t d^ r e p r e s e n t t h e t y p e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e t h a t c a n b e u s e d a t t h e 
n t h s e c t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n r o u t e . A s s o c i a t e d w i t h e a c h t y p e o f c o u n t e r -
m e a s u r e i s a s e t o f p a r a m e t e r v a l u e s t h a t a r e u s e d a s t h e v a r i a b l e s i n 
E q u a t i o n ( 2 - 2 ) o f t h e s c e n a r i o m o d e l . The f u n c t i o n L ( d , e ) d e n o t e s 
n n n 
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a i r c r a f t l o s s and i s c a l c u l a t e d f rom t h e m o d e l when 
a number e o f c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s o f t y p e d a r e u s e d i n t h e n t h s e c t i o n , 
n J r n 
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Tact ica l a i r c r a f t are designed to carry ordnance mounted i n ­
te rna l ly and external ly i n pods located below the wings and fuselage. 
Extra fue l i s also carr ied in externally-mounted pods. Any counter-
measures that are to be used must be mounted in the same manner. The 
number of countermeasures that can be carr ied i s often l imi ted more 
by the number of pods avai lab le than by volume or weight constra ints . 
The capacity function X (d ,e ) represents the capacity needed when e r J n n n r r n 
units of countermeasures type d are to be used. The value of X (d ,e ) 
J * n n n n 
w i l l normally be the capacity per unit times the number of u n i t s . 
A f ixed capacity constraint X i s assumed to be known. This may 
not be the case when the mission planner i s deciding the r e l a t i v e merit 
of adding countermeasures at the expense of displacing ordnance or f u e l . 
However, i t w i l l be seen that the procedure to be used to determine the 
optimum deployment strategy also gives the optimum strategy for a set 
of subproblems which have capacity constraints less than the f ixed con­
s t r a i n t X. I f the problem i s solved for a maximum conceivable capacity 
constra int , the mission planner can use the solutions to the subproblems 
i n making his decisions. 
Having selected the capacity constraint X , the mission planner's 
problem is to determine the number and type of countermeasure to use 
at each section of the route to obtain the greatest probabi l i ty of 
surv iva l of the a i r c r a f t while keeping the t o t a l capacity wi th in the 
constraint . The probabi l i ty of the a i r c r a f t surviv ing the mission i s 
denoted since i t i s a product of the probabi l i ty of the a i r c r a f t 
surv iv ing each of the N sections of the mission route. The mathematical 













X (d ,e ) < X (3-2) n n n 
d = 1 , 2 , . . . 5 d n ' ' n 
e = 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . 
n 
X (d ,e ) > 0 n n n 
for 
n = 1 , 2 , . . . , N . 
I t should be noted that the problem formulated here can be 
thought of as a s e r i a l multi-stage decision system as described in 
Chapter I . The sections of the mission route correspond to the stages 
of Figure 1 . At each stage n the decisions are how many countermeasures 
to use, e , and what type countermeasure to use, d . This can be n J r n 
expressed as the decision vector D = (d ,e ) . The state vector and r n n ' n 
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s t a g e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n can b e o b t a i n e d f rom t h e c o n s t r a i n t r e l a t i o n . 
The r e t u r n a t e a c h s t a g e h a s t h e same f u n c t i o n a l form and t h e t o t a l 
N - s t a g e r e t u r n i s e x p r e s s e d i n an e q u a t i o n s i m i l a r t o E q u a t i o n ( 1 - 9 ) . 
The u s u a l s o l u t i o n p r o c e d u r e f o r p r o b l e m s o f t h i s t y p e a r e e i t h e r 
o p t i m i z a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s b a s e d on t h e c a l c u l u s o r d i r e c t e n u m e r a t i o n 
m e t h o d s . The o p t i m i z a t i o n m e t h o d s u t i l i z e a l g o r i t h m s o r s e a r c h p r o c e ­
d u r e s w h i c h c o n v e r g e on a s o l u t i o n i n a f i n i t e number o f s t e p s . How­
e v e r , t o p r o v e c o n v e r g e n c e f o r an a l g o r i t h m t h a t s o l v e s t h i s c l a s s o f 
p r o b l e m s , some r a t h e r r e s t r i c t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s a r e o f t e n made a b o u t t h e 
form o f t h e p r o b l e m . T y p i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s a r e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n ­
t i n u o u s l y d i f f e r e n t i a b l e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , a c o n c a v e o b j e c t i v e f u n c ­
t i o n , d i f f e r e n t i a b l e c o n s t r a i n t s , and c o n v e x s e t s o f c o n s t r a i n t s . The 
u s u a l m e t h o d s b a s e d on c a l c u l u s a r e n o t e a s y t o a p p l y t o t h i s p r o b l e m 
b e c a u s e t h e e x i s t e n c e o f v a r i o u s c o u n t e r m e a s u r e t y p e s d c a u s e s d i s -
n 
c o n t i n u i t y i n t h e f u n c t i o n s X ( d , e ) and L ( d , e ) . 
J n n ' n n n n 
I n t h e d i r e c t e n u m e r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e a l l f e a s i b l e s e t s o f n o n -
n e g a t i v e i n t e g e r s d and e a r e u s e d t o e v a l u a t e t h e o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n 
to • n n J 
S > T . The s e t o r s e t s o f d and e w h i c h g i v e t h e maximum v a l u e o f t h e N n n 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n i s t h e n s e l e c t e d a s t h e opt imum d e p l o y m e n t s t r a t e g y . 
I n u t i l i z i n g t h i s p r o c e d u r e , a v e r y l a r g e number o f s e t s must b e 
e x a m i n e d i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e opt imum f o r e v e n a m o d e s t s i z e p r o b ­
l e m . C o n s i d e r f o r e x a m p l e , a p r o b l e m i n v o l v i n g f o u r d i f f e r e n t c o u n t e r -
m e a s u r e t y p e s t h a t c a n b e d e p l o y e d a t any o f t e n s e c t i o n s o f t h e r o u t e . 
I f e a c h v a r i a b l e e can t a k e on f i v e d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s f o r e a c h t y p e o f 
n J r 
c o u n t erme a s u r e , t h e n t h e r e a r e (4 -x5 )~^ d i f f e r e n t s e t s t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n 
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order to f ind the optimum. I t would take an extremely long time to 
evaluate each of these sets even with the aid of a modern computer. 
Therefore, a bet ter computation procedure i s needed. 
Dynamic programming provides an excellent computational procedure 
for th is type optimization problem. I t allows the mission planner's 
N section decision problem containing many variables to be solved by a 
ser ies of one-section problems containing r e l a t i v e l y few var iab les . 
When the conditions given by Equation (1-10) have been met, the problem 
can be decomposed into N subproblems. Then, the solutions to the sub-
problems can be combined to obtain the solution to the o r ig ina l problem. 
Thus, instead of solving one optimization problem i n which a l l of the 
decisions are interdependent, the optimal decisions are determined 
almost one at a time. 
The computational advantage of dynamic programming over d i rect 
enumeration i s considerable. This i s due to two reasons. At each stage 
for the given capacity constraint a l l non-optimal combinations of dec i ­
sion var iables d and e are eliminated from further consideration and 
n n 
are not used in any of the fol lowing stages. For the above example, the 
dynamic programming approach need only consider (M-x5) x 10 sets of dec i ­
sion variables whereas direct enumeration required the consideration of 
(4x5)"^ sets of decision var iab les . The second computational advantage 
is in the number of mult ip l icat ions required to evaluate the object ive 
function S . Dynamic programming requires only a s ingle mul t ip l icat ion 
to compute the value of the object ive function which i s compared at each 
stage. The direct enumeration requires n mult ip l icat ions to compute the 
value of the object ive function for each set of decision var iab les . 
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Dynamic Programming R e c u r s i o n E q u a t i o n s 
The p r o c e d u r e t o b e u s e d i n s o l v i n g t h e m i s s i o n p l a n n e r ' s p r o b l e m 
must b e a b l e t o e x a m i n e a l l f e a s i b l e s e t s o f t h e d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e w i t h ­
o u t m i s s i n g t h e o p t i m a l o r v i o l a t i n g t h e c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n t . The 
r e c u r s i o n e q u a t i o n s o f d y n a m i c programming a l l o w u s t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s 
o n e s t a g e a t a t i m e . T h e s e r e c u r s i o n e q u a t i o n s a r e o b t a i n e d b y d e c o m ­
p o s i n g t h e p r o b l e m . 
The p r o b l e m t o b e d e c o m p o s e d can b e w r i t t e n i n a form s i m i l a r t o 
E q u a t i o n ( 1 - 9 ) b y d e n o t i n g t h e maximum o f a s f ( X ) . T h i s r e f l e c t s 
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e maximum o f t h e f u n c t i o n ST T o v e r t h e d e c i s i o n s p a c e 
d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e f e a s i b l e v a l u e s o f d^ and ( n = l , . . . , N ) d e p e n d s upon 
N and X. The p r o b l e m t o b e d e c o m p o s e d i s 
N 
f ( X ) = max <j n [ l - L (d , e ) ] *> (3-3) 
N n -i n n n d l 9 . . . , d N [ n=l 
e i " " ' e N 
s u b j e c t t o 
N I X ( d , e ) < X (3-4) u
 n n n n n = l 
w h e r e t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n i s o v e r a l l f e a s i b l e n o n n e g a t i v e i n t e g e r s d and 
• n 
e ( n = l , 2 , . . . , N ) . 
n 
The s e p a r a b i l i t y and m o n o t o n i c i t y c o n d i t i o n s r e q u i r e d f o r d e c o m ­
p o s i t i o n a r e e a s i l y v e r i f i e d . S i n c e S r e p r e s e n t s t h e p r o d u c t i n E q u a ­
t i o n ( 3 -3 ) . T h a t i s 
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N 
S = n [ l - L ( d , e ) ] . N n n n n n=l 
(3-5) 
By Equation (1-10) the separabi l i ty condition i s s a t i s f i e d since Equa­
t ion (3-5) can obviously be wr i t ten as 
S N = [1-LN (dN>V ] •fV1-Ln(dn'en):lf>= ^ V W 3 ' S N - 1 ' 
n=l 
Since [ l - L (d ,e ) ] i s a probab i l i ty , i t s values are nonnegative r e a l n n n J 
numb ers only. Then i f S ^ _ ^ > the inequal i ty 
S N = [ 1 - L N ( d N ' e N ) ] • S N - 1 ̂  [ 1 - L N ( d N > e N ) ] ' S N - 1 = S N 
holds for a l l values of [ 1 - L ^ ( d ^ , e ^ ) ] . This i s the desired monotonicity 
property. Thus, the problem may be decomposed. This means that the 
posit ion of maximization with respect to d and e for n = l , . . . , N - l can r n n 
be moved inside the Nth stage function with no p o s s i b i l i t y of missing 
the optimal solut ion. 
Thus the problem may be wr i t ten 
f (X) = max̂  
6 N 
C L -V d N> e N ) ] : m a x A 
d l ' " " d N - l 
e i 9 ' * * s 6 N - l 
N-1 




X (d ,e ) < X , n n n (3-7) 
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w h e r e t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n i s o v e r a l l f e a s i b l e n o n n e g a t i v e i n t e g e r s d 
n 
and ( n = l , . . . , N ) . S i n c e t h e f u n c t i o n 
N - l 
max < n [ 1 - L (d , e ) ] , 
A A i n n n 
d l > " " d N - l ^ n = 1 J 
e i , , , , , e N - l 
d e p e n d s on t h e v a l u e s o f d^ and e^ o n l y t h r o u g h t h e c o n s t r a i n t , i t can 
b e m a x i m i z e d s e p a r a t e l y f o r any g i v e n v a l u e o f d and e ^ . From t h e 
d e f i n i t i o n o f i ^ ( X ) i t f o l l o w s t h a t 
N - l 
f N - l [ X - X N ( d N ' e N ) ] = m x 1 1 1 [ 1 - L n ( d n ' e n ) ] r ( 3 _ 8 ) 
d l " * " d N - l i n = 1 
e i ' " " d N - l 
s u b j e c t t o 
N-l 
I X ( d , e ) < X - X K T ( d M 9 e . T ) ( 3 - 9 ) L
n n n n N N N n = l 
w h e r e 
d = 1 , 2 , . . . , d 
n n 
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Equation 3-6 may now be wr i t ten 
f N ( X ) = m a x { [ l - L N ( d N l e N ) ] • f ^ C X - X ^ d ^ ) ] } . (3-10) 
The or ig ina l N-stage problem can now be considered as two smaller 
optimization problems. F i r s t , ^ " ^ N ^ N » E N ^ "*"s c a l c u l a ' t e d for a l l 
feasib le values of d^ and e^. Second, Equation (3-10) i s used to se lect 
the optimal decision var iables d^ and e^. By t reat ing f^ ^ [X-X^(d^ ,e^) ] 
and then f ^ C X - X ^ t d ^ , e N _ 1 ) ] , . . . ^ [ X - X ^ d 1 . e ^ ] , for arb i t rary X, 
in the same manner as f ( X ) , the o r i g i n a l N stage problem can be decom­
posed into N one-stage optimization problems. The recursion equations 
are 
f (X) = max { [ l - L (d ,e ) ] • f . [X-X (d ,e ) ] } (3-11) 
n v (A \^ n n ' n n-1 n n n X (d ,e )<X n n n 
d =1 ,2 , . . . ,d 
n n 
e =1,2 ,3 , . . . 
n 
for arb i t rary X and n=2,3 , . . . ,N 
and 
f (X) = max [ l - L (d ,e ) ] (3-12) 
x 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) < X 1 1 
d ^ l ^ , . . . , d 1 
e . ^ 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . 
for arb i t rary X. 
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Their recursive so lu t ion , s ta r t ing with n=l and continuing through n=N, 
y ie lds the optimal value of f ^ ( x ) , and the optimal decisions. 
Computational Procedure 
In solving the recursion equatins, f (k) i s calculated for 
speci f ied values of k and for each section of the route n = l , 2 , . . . , N . 
Since k and X (d ,e ) could take on a l l nonnegative r e a l numbers less n n n 
than or equal to X , i t would be d i f f i c u l t , i f not impossible, to evalu­
ate a l l values of f ( k ) . Therefore, these functions w i l l be evaluated 
n 
using only integer values of k, X (d ,e ) , and X. 
n n n 
The computational procedure begins by ca lculat ing f^(k) for each 
k = 0 , l , . . . , X by using Equation (3-12) . I t i s assumed that i f e^ , counter-
measures of type d^ are avai lable at the l a s t section of the route 
(stage 1 in Figure 1 ) , then they are a l l deployed i n that sect ion . In 
computing f^(k) for a given capacity k only the maximum capacity 
X^(d^,e^) < k i s considered, and the maximizations are carr ied out for 
the combinations of d^ and e^ which are r e s t r i c t e d to the nonnegative 
integers that sa t is fy th is constraint . The values of d^ and e^ which 
maximize f^(k) are denoted d^(k) and ej^(k) . 
Having computed f^(k) for k = 0 , l , . . . , X the recursion equation 
(3-11) i s used to compute f n ( k ) for k = 0 , l , . . . , X and for n=2,3 , . . . , N - 1 . 
Beginning with n=2, the values of f^ik) are obtained by carrying out the 
maximizations over a l l possible combinations of d^ and e^ which are 
r e s t r i c t e d to the nonnegative integers that sa t is fy X^(d^3e^) < k. To 
carry out the calculat ions for each k Equation (3-11) can be expressed 
as 
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max { [ l - L ( l , e ) ] - f [k-X ( l , e ) ] } 
X 2 ( l , e 2 ) < k 
e 2 = l , 2 , 3 . . . 
f 2 ( k ) = max 
max { [ l - L ( 2 9 e 9 ) ] - f n [ k - X ( 2 9 e 0 ) ] } 
X 2 (2 ,e 2 )<k Z Z L Z 2 
e 2 = l , 2 9 3 . . . 
_max { [ 1 - L 2 ( d 2 , e 2 ) ] f ^ k - X ^ ^ , e 2 ) ] } 
X 2 ( d 2 , e 2 ) < k 
e 2 = l , 2 , 3 . . . 
Since d 2 assumes only the values 1 , 2 , . . . , d , a maximization can be car­
r i e d out over the feasib le values of e 2 for a given d 2 . When the maxi­
mums have been calculated for each feasib le value of d 2 , the largest of 
these maximums i s selected as the value of f 2 ( k ) . The values of d 2 and 
e 2 that maximize f 2 ( k ) are denoted d^(k) and E^(K) . A s imi lar procedure 
i s then used to compute fg(k) for k = 0 , l , . . . , X and i s repeated u n t i l the 
Nt/z stage i s to be evaluated. 
At stage N one often needs only evaluate f^(X) to determine the 
optimum. The object ive function for the mission planner's problem 
allows t h i s . However, i t w i l l be seen that the object ive function for 
the countermeasure evaluators problem has a form that requires the 
evaluation of f „ ( k ) for k = 0 , l , . . . , X . The values of f , T (k) are calculated 
using Equation (3-11) and the procedure described above. Then the r e l a ­
t ion 
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f (X) = max f (k) (3-13) 
k 
i s used to determine the optimum. Finding the values for f ( k ) , 
k = 0 , l , . . . , X , provides information the mission planner can use in making 
the decision concerning the merit of replacing ordnance or fue l with 
countermeasures. The values of d^(X) and e-^(X) that determine the 
optimum value f^(X) are denoted d* and e * . This i s the optimum deploy­
ment strategy for section N of the mission route. 
When carrying out the computations, i t i s convenient to use 
t a b l e s , such as Table 1 , to store the maximum values f (k) and the 
n 
decisions d ' (k ) and e ' ( k ) for a l l values of k. I t should be noted that n n 
the maximum, f ( k ) , may have more than one optimal decision set d^(k) 
and ^ ( k ) . The a l te rnat ive decisions may also be conveniently recorded 
in the tab les . 
Table 1 . Stage n Decision Table 
k e ' ( k ) n d ' (k ) n f (k) n 
0 e ' (0 ) n d n ( 0 ) f (o) 
n 
1 e ' ( l ) n d ' ( l ) 
n 
f (1) n 










e ' ( X ) n 
• 
d ' (X) n f (x) 
n 
When calculat ing the values of f (k) for n=2 ,3 , . . . ,N , the value 
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o f f n [ k - X ( d , e ) ] i s n e e d e d f o r a l l f e a s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s o f d and n - 1 n n n n 
e . S i n c e t h e v a l u e s o f f n ( k ) h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n c a l c u l a t e d f o r n n - 1 J 
k = 0 , l , . . . , X , t h e v a l u e o f f , [ k - X ( d , e ) ] can b e o b t a i n e d from t h e 
' n - 1 n n n 
t a b l e s f o r s t a g e n - 1 , b y u s i n g t h e v a l u e o f f ^ ( k ) c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o 
t h e number k-X ( d , e ) i n t h e k c o l u m n . N o t e t h a t i n c a l c u l a t i n g 
n n n • 
f ^ ( k ) t h e v a l u e s o f f^ ^ ( k ) may n o t b e n e e d e d f o r e v e r y v a l u e o f k . 
I f t h e c a p a c i t y r e q u i r e d b y t h e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s i s u n i t y , f ^ ( k ) m u s t 
b e o b t a i n e d f o r a l l k = 0 , 1 , . . . , X - 1 . H o w e v e r , i f t h e v a l u e s o f X and 
X , T ( d , T , e 1 T ) a s s u m e o n l y e v e n n u m b e r s , f"T n ( k ) i s n e e d e d f o r o n l y e v e n N N N N - 1 J 
numbers o f k . B u t , i n o r d e r t o c a l c u l a t e f ^ ( k ) f o r e a c h k , t h e 
v a l u e s o f ^ _ 2 ' - ^ ~ X N - l ^ d N - l ' 6 N - 1 ^ m u s ~ t ^ e o b t a i n e d f o r a l l t h e c o m b i n a ­
t i o n s o f ^ and t h a t s a t i s f y t h e c o n s t r a i n t X^ ^ ( d ^ j _ » e ^ - k . 
T h u s , f o r a l a r g e number o f v a r i a b l e s , i t i s u s u a l l y e a s i e r t o c a l c u l a t e 
f^Ck) f o r e v e r y i n t e g e r v a l u e o f k t h a n t o t r a c e b a c k t h r o u g h e a c h s t a g e 
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l u e s o f k f o r w h i c h f ( k ) w i l l b e n e e d e d . 
n 
A f t e r t h e opt imum d e p l o y m e n t s t r a t e g y i s o b t a i n e d f o r s e c t i o n N 
o f t h e r o u t e , t h e r e l a t i o n ( 3 - 9 ) , d^ and e c a n b e u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e 
t h e opt imum s t r a t e g y f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e s e c t i o n s . I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e 
maximum i n E q u a t i o n ( 3 - 8 ) , t h e r e l a t i o n 
N - 1 ^ 
J X ( d , e ) < X - X M ( d " e " ) L ^ n n ' n N N N 
n = l 
mus t h o l d f o r t h e r e m a i n i n g v a r i a b l e s . I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h i s maximum 
i s f ^ _ ^ [ X - X ^ ( d ^ , e ^ ) ] . The d e c i s i o n v a r i a b l e s , d^_^ and e ^ , t h a t g i v e 
t h i s maximum a r e d ^ _ ^ [ X - X ^ d ^ , e ^ ) ] and e ^ _ ^ [ X - X ^ ( d ^ e ) ] . They d e t e r m i n e 
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t h e opt imum d e p l o y m e n t s t r a t e g y o f s e c t i o n N - l w h i c h a r e d e n o t e d 
v i = e N - i c x - y d N ' e N ) ] -
T h e s e v a l u e s may b e o b t a i n e d d i r e c t l y f rom t h e t a b l e f o r s t a g e N - l 
i n t h e row f o r k = X - X ^ ( d ^ e ^ ) . I n a s i m i l a r manner t h e s t r a t e g y f o r 
s e c t i o n N-2 i s o b t a i n e d from 
4-2 - d N - 2 C X - y V ^ - X N - l ( d N - l > e N - l ) ] 
V 2 = S i - 2 c x - y y e > y i ( d N - i > e N - i ) ] -
I n g e n e r a l t h e r e c u r s i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
n - i 
d" = dA [X - T X,T . ( d " . , e " . ) ] N-n Ttf-n . L . N - i N - i 5 N - i 
1 = 0 
( 3 - 1 4 ) 
n - i 
e" = e ' CX - V X.T . ( & ! . , e " . ) ] N-n N-n , L . N - i l - i ' N - i i = 0 
c a n b e u s e d t o f i n d t h e opt imum s t r a t e g i e s f o r t h e r e m a i n i n g s e c t i o n s 
o f t h e r o u t e . 
The C o u n t e r m e a s u r e E v a l u a t o r ' s P r o b l e m 
C o s t - E f f e c t i v e n e s s C r i t e r i o n 
The p r o b l e m f a c i n g t h e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e e v a l u a t o r i s s i m i l a r t o 
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the mission planner's problem. He i s interested in the probabi l i ty of 
s u r v i v a l of the penetrator, but he must also consider the monetary cost 
associated with the probabi l i ty of s u r v i v a l . Thus the c r i t e r i o n he 
uses i s cost -e f fect iveness. 
The primary problem facing the countermeasure evaluator i s that 
of determining the r e l a t i v e effect iveness of new countermeasure designs 
or modifications to exist ing countermeasures. For countermeasures in 
the expendable class improvements are usually made in such items as the 
antenna, power source and the del ivery system. The cost of these 
improvements i s often in terms of increased volume and weight as w e l l as 
monetary value. Trade-offs are ava i lab le between the cost of del ivery 
systems that put low-powered jammers close to the radar and the cost of 
increasing the jammer power while using a less accurate del ivery system. 
In order to evaluate the various countermeasure designs, the man­
ner in which the countermeasures can be employed must be considered. 
Countermeasures deployed in a non-optimal manner w i l l not appear as 
e f fec t i ve as they would i f they were deployed using an optimal deployment 
strategy. Thus, in evaluating the countermeasures, the evaluator needs 
to determine the optimum deployment strategy for each countermeasure. 
Then, i f the optimum strategy i s p r a c t i c a l to implement, i t should be 
used in the evaluat ion. Even i f the optimum strategy i s impract ical to 
implement, the procedure developed here provides information that the 
evaluator can use in determining the bes t , p r a c t i c a l strategy. 
As noted in Chapter I , the cost-ef fect iveness c r i t e r i o n often 
used by the countermeasure evaluator i s expected cost . The costs 
4 8 
associated with the mission are the cost of the countermeasures and the 
cost associated with the possible loss of the a i r c r a f t . The cost of 
the countermeasures i s a determinist ic cost that includes such costs as 
research, development, manufacture and shipment. The cost associated 
with the loss of the a i r c r a f t i s the weighted cost calculated by mul t i ­
p ly ing the value of the mission a i r c r a f t by the probabi l i ty of a i r c r a f t 
l o s s . The function C (d ,e ) represents the cost of using e units of 
n n n n 
countermeasure type d in the nth section of the mission route. This 
* n 
w i l l usually be the cost per unit times the number of u n i t s , however, 
i t could be the cost of a precursor rocket or missi le plus the cost of 
the expendable jammers. Let K denote the cost of the a i r c r a f t and E > T the 
expected cost of the mission. 
When using the expected cost of the mission as the c r i t e r i o n , the 
evaluator i s interested in determining the deployment strategy that min­
imizes i t . One method that could be used to determine th is minimum 
would be to use the deployment strategy employed by the mission planner. 
The procedure presented i n the previous section would be used to solve 
the mission planner's problem, ca lcula t ing for k = 0 , l , . . . , X and 
determining the optimal st rategies associated with each value of k. The 
minimum expected cost could then be found from the re la t ion 
N A A 
E N = min{ I C n (d^,e^) + K - [ l - f ( k ) ] } (3-15) 
k n=l 
where d^ and i s the optimum deployment strategy associated with each 
k. However, the optimum E^ determined by th is procedure may not be the 
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minimum expected cost of the mission, since th is method does not con­
sider a l l possible sets of d and e . I t considers only the sets d 
* n n J n 
and e , the optimum deployment strategy for the mission planner's prob­
lem. Since the expected cost determined by th is method does r e f l e c t 
the actual strategy that would be employed by the user of the counter-
measures, i t may be of in terest to the evaluator. 
An object ive function that can be used to determine the minimum 
expected cost of the mission can be formulated by considering the sec­
tions of the mission route as stages depicted in Figure 1 . Note that 
stage 1 i s the l a s t section of the mission route while stage N i s the 
f i r s t sec t ion . For a penetrator a r r iv ing at sect ion 1 , the expected 
cost of th is section i s the cost of the countermeasures employed in t h i 
section plus the weighted cost associated with the penetrator not sur­
v iv ing th is sect ion . This i s expressed as 
C 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) + K . L 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) . (3-16) 
Now considering stage 2 as depicted in Figure 1 , the expected 
cost of the mission at th is section i s the sum of the cost of the 
countermeasures employed in th is sec t ion , the weighted cost associated 
with the penetrator not surviv ing the sect ion with probabi l i ty L^Cd ,e 
and the weighted cost associated with the penetrator surviv ing the 
section with probabi l i ty 1 - L^id^^e^). This i s expressed as 
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C 2 ( d 2 , e 2 ) + K - L 2 ( d 2 , e 2 ) (3-17) 
+ [ l - L 2 ( d 2 , e 2 ) ] - [ C 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) + K - L 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) ] . 
Proceeding in a s imi lar manner through each sec t ion , the N-section 
expected cost equation i s 
E N = + K - L N ( d N ' e N } +
 CWVV ]* J w V l ' ^ W + 
K # L N - l ( d N - l ' e N - l ) + C l - L N - l ( d N - l ' e N - l ) ] * 
[ C 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) + K - L 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) ] (3-18) 
Mathematical Formulation and the Recursion Equations 
The mathematical formulation of the countermeasure evaluator 's 
problem can now be sta ted . Let h^(X) denote the minimum expected cost 
of the mission when X units of capacity are ava i l ab le . The problem 
statement i s 
h (X) m m <, 
d 1 , . . . , d N 
el'---' eN 
CN ( dN' eN ) + K , V dN' eN ) 
+ [ 1 - L N ( d N ' e N ) ] C N - l ( d N - l ' e N - l ) + K * L N - l ( d N - l ' e N - l ) 




X (d ,e ) < X (3-20) n n n 
where 
and 
d = 1 , 2 , . . . , d 
n n 
e = 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . 
n 
X (d ,e ) > 0 n n n 
for 
n = 1 , 2 , . . . , N . 
To ver i fy the separabi l i ty and monotonicity conditions required 
for decomposition, rewri te Equation (3-18) , expressing i t in the form 
of Equation (1-10). This gives the equation 
E N = V W + K V W + C 1 - V d N > e N ) ] - E N - r ( 3 - 2 1 ) 
Since a l l the costs in Equation (18) are p o s i t i v e , K, C (d ,e ) , 
^ r n n n 
L (d ,e ) , and l - L (d ,e ) are defined so that the i r range consists of n n ' n n n n to 
the nonnegative r e a l numbers only. Thus, i f > "the inequal i ty 




CN ( dN 'V + K ,VV eN ) + [ 1 - L N ( d N ' e N ) ] , E N - l = E N 
holds for a l l values of K, C^(d^,e^), L^(d^,e^) and 1-L^(d^,e^) . Hence, 
the separabi l i ty and monotonicity properties hold , and the posit ion of 
the maximization with respect to d and e for n = l , 2 , . . . , N - 1 can be 
r n n 
moved inside the Y\TH stage function allowing the problem to be solved 
using recursive equations, one stage at a time. 
The recursive equations follow immediately from Equation (3-21) 
and the def in i t ion of h ( X ) . They are 
h (X) = min {c (d ,e ) + K-L (d ,e ) (3-22) 
X (d ,e )<X n n n n n n n n 5 n 
d =1 ,2 , . . . ,d 
n n 
e n = l , 2 , 3 , . . . 
+ [ l - L (d . e J ] ' h n [ X - X (d ,e ) ] } n n n n-1 n n n 
for arb i t rary X and n=2,3, . . . ,N 
and 
h (X) = min [ C n ( d n , e ) + K»L, (d ,e ) ] . (3-23) 
1 X 1 ( d 1 , e 1 ) < X 1 1 1 i l l 
d 1 = l 9 2 9 . . . , d n 
e i = l , 2 , 3 , . . . 
for arb i t rary X. 
Their recursive solut ion i s carr ied out in the same manner as the r e ­
cursive solut ion to the mission planner's problem as described in the 
section on computational procedure. 
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Numerical Examples 
As a numerical example to i l l u s t r a t e the appl icat ion of the r e ­
cursion equations, consider a countermeasure evaluation problem. The 
countermeasures include three di f ferent types of expendable jammers and 
two di f ferent types of transponder-equipped chaff dispensers. Their 
parameters are l i s t e d in Table 2. 
Table 2. Expendable Countermeasure Parameters 
Countermeasure Types 
Parameters 1 2 3 4 5 
Power 1 1 40 False Target 
False 
Target 
Number/Dispenser 10 20 1 25 15 
Cost 1500 5000 8000 8000 5000 
Minimum Range 7 5 4 A i rc ra f t Range 
A i r c r a f t 
Range 
Capacity Required 1 CM 10 CM 1 
Type 1 i s a rocket dispenser that disperses expendable jammers along a 
stra ight l i n e path p a r a l l e l to the a i r c r a f t f l i g h t route as depicted in 
Figure 3. Type 2 i s a rocket dispenser that disperses expendable jam­
mers at an approximately uniform range from the radar. Type 3 i s a 
rocket dispenser that carr ies a single jammer which i s dispensed close 
to the radar. Types 4 and 5 are chaff dispensers equipped with t rans ­
ponders that create 25 and 15 moving ta rge ts , respect ive ly . These 
fa lse targets appear in the v i c i n i t y of the a i r c r a f t , and cannot be 
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distinguished from the a i r c r a f t by the radar operator. Each type 
countermeasure i s considered avai lab le for use at each section of the 
route, but only one type can be used in a sect ion . 
The defensive system i s a missi le s i t e with a radar and missi le 
range of 40 mi les. The route of the a i r c r a f t i s a s t r a i g h t - l i n e route 
and the closest penetration to the missi le s i t e i s 15 mi les. The route 
i s divided into eight sections which are each ten miles long. The cost 
of the a i r c r a f t i s $2,500,000 and the capacity ava i lab le for countermeas­
ures i s 30 un i ts . The a i r c r a f t radar cross sections vary from 2 to 30. 
Table 3 shows the resul ts of the computation for section 8 of the 
route. 
Table 3. Section 8 Decision Table 
Capacity Expected Capacity Expected 
X Number Type Cost X Number Type Cost 
0 0 1958743.87 16 1 1 72293.06 
1 0 1791927.81 17 1 1 73778.39 
2 0 1573757.23 18 1 1 75263.72 
C
O
 0 1330614.09 19 1 1 67812.50 
4 0 1025876.95 20 1 1 54032.26 
5 0 764116.66 21 1 1 52500 .00 
6 0 459187.43 22 1 1 52176.47 
7 0 318140.60 23 1 1 53669.12 
8 1 1 168983.85 24 1 1 55161.76 
9 1 1 136212.92 25 1 1 56478.26 
10 1 1 103188.48 26 1 1 56156.86 
11 1 1 89564.01 27 1 1 57649.51 
12 1 1 75950.83 28 1 1 32000.00 
13 1 1 74410.06 29 2 1 33500 .00 
14 1 1 72931.83 30 3 1 35000 .00 
15 1 1 72605.82 
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The values of the function h (X) and the decisions d (X) and e (X) are 
o o o 
shown. From th is table the minimum expected cost i s $32,000.00, and 
the optimum capacity required i s 28 u n i t s , which i s s l i g h t l y less than 
the 30 units ava i lab le . Table 4 shows the optimum deployment strategies 
for th is problem. 
Table 4. Optimum Deployment Strategy 
for the Evaluat ion Problem 
Section Number Type 
of Route Required Required 
1 1 1 
2 1 1 
3 1 2 
4 1 3 
5 1 3 
6 1 2 
7 1 1 
8 1 1 
To provide a comparative example the mission planner's object ive 
function was used in ca lculat ing the resul ts to the problem described 
above. Table 5 shows the probabi l i ty of the a i r c r a f t ' s surviv ing the 
mission and the expected cost associated with each capacity from zero 
to 30 units for both the mission planner's objective function and the 
countermeasure evaluator 's object ive funct ion. The expected cost 
associated with the mission planner's object ive function was calculated 
using Equation (3-15) . 
The optimum solution to the problem i s the same when the a v a i l ­
able capacity i s 30 u n i t s . However, i t i s in terest ing to determine 
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w h a t t h e s o l u t i o n s a r e when t h e a v a i l a b l e c a p a c i t y i s c o n s i d e r e d t o b e 
25 u n i t s . When u s i n g t h e m i s s i o n p l a n n e r ' s o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n t h e 
opt imum c a p a c i t y n e e d e d i s 25 u n i t s , w h e r e a s t h e opt imum c a p a c i t y n e e d e d 
i s 22 u n i t s when u s i n g t h e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e e v a l u a t o r ' s o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n . 
T a b l e 5 . R e s u l t s U s i n g D i f f e r e n t O b j e c t i v e F u n c t i o n s 
M i s s i o n P l a n n e r C o u n t e r m e a s u r e E v a l u a t o r 
P r o b a b i l i t y E x p e c t e d P r o b a b i l i t y E x p e c t e d 
C a p a c i t y o f S u r v i v a l C o s t o f S u r v i v a l C o s t 
0 . 2 1 6 5 0 2 4 5 1 9 5 8 7 4 3 . 8 9 . 2 1 6 5 0 2 4 5 1 9 5 8 7 4 3 . 8 7 
1 . 2 8 4 1 5 9 4 7 1 7 9 4 6 0 1 . 3 3 . 2 8 4 1 5 9 4 7 1 7 9 1 9 2 7 . 8 1 
CM
 . 3 7 2 9 5 9 3 0 1 5 7 7 6 0 1 . 7 3 . 3 7 2 9 5 9 30 1 5 7 3 7 5 7 . 2 3 
CO
 . 4 7 1 4 1 8 8 9 1 3 3 6 4 5 2 . 7 8 . 4 7 1 4 1 8 8 9 1 3 3 0 6 1 4 . 0 9 
4 . 5 9 5 8 7 1 3 7 10 30 3 2 1 . 6 0 . 5 9 5 8 7 1 3 7 1 0 2 5 8 7 6 . 9 5 
5 . 7 0 1 0 2 5 1 4 7 6 8 9 3 7 . 1 7 . 7 0 1 0 2 5 1 4 7 6 4 1 1 6 . 6 6 
6 . 8 2 4 7 3 5 4 5 4 6 1 1 6 1 . 38 . 8 2 4 7 3 5 4 5 4 5 9 1 8 7 . 4 3 
7 . 8 8 1 6 8 3 2 0 3 2 0 2 9 2 . 0 0 . 8 8 1 6 8 3 1 9 3 1 8 1 4 0 . 6 0 
8 . 9 4 2 5 6 3 1 7 1 6 9 5 9 2 . 1 0 . 9 4 2 5 6 3 1 7 1 6 8 9 8 3 . 8 5 
9 . 9 5 5 6 8 7 2 8 1 3 6 7 8 1 . 7 9 . 9 5 5 6 8 7 2 8 1 3 6 2 1 2 . 9 2 
10 . 9 6 8 9 9 4 1 4 1 0 3 5 1 4 . 6 5 . 9 6 8 9 9 4 1 4 1 0 3 1 8 8 . 4 8 
1 1 . 9 7 6 4 3 6 5 0 8 9 9 0 8 . 7 6 . 9 7 6 4 3 6 5 0 8 9 5 6 4 . 0 1 
12 . 9 8 3 9 3602 76159 . 9 7 . 9 8 3 9 3602 7 5 9 5 0 . 8 3 
1 3 . 9 8 6 5 4 4 5 3 7 4 6 3 8 . 6 6 . 9 8 6 5 4 4 5 3 7 4 4 1 0 . 0 6 
1 4 . 9 8 9 1 5 9 9 7 73100 . 0 7 . 9 8 9 1 5 9 9 7 729 3 1 . 8 3 
15 . 9 9 0 4 8 9 1 3 7 4 7 7 7 . 19 . 9 8 9 6 8 9 89 7 2 6 0 5 . 8 2 
16 . 9 9 1 8 2 0 0 8 76449 . 79 . 9 9 0 2 2 0 1 1 7 2 2 9 3 . 0 6 
17 . 9 9 2 6 2 5 6 6 7 9 4 3 5 . 8 7 . 9 9 0 2 2 0 1 1 7 3 7 7 8 . 3 9 
1 8 . 9 9 3 4 3 1 9 0 8 2 4 2 0 . 2 6 . 9 9 0 2 2 0 1 1 7 5 2 6 3 . 7 2 
19 . 9 9 3 9 7 2 3 2 86069 . 2 1 . 9 8 4 3 7 5 0 0 6 7 8 1 2 . 5 0 
20 . 9 9 4 5 1 3 0 3 89 717 . 4 1 . 9 9 1 9 3 5 4 9 5 4 0 3 2 . 2 6 
2 1 . 9 9 4 9 0 0 7 4 9 3748 . 1 7 . 9 9 4 5 6 5 2 2 5 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
22 . 9 9 5 9 0 1 6 4 5 4 2 4 5 . 8 9 . 9 9 5 0 9 8 0 4 5 2 1 7 6 . 4 7 
2 3 . 9 9 6 7 1 0 5 4 5 7 2 2 3 . 6 5 . 9 9 5 0 9 8 0 4 5 3 6 6 9 . 1 2 
2 4 . 9 9 7 2 5 2 7 5 6 0 8 6 8 . 1 3 . 9 9 5 0 9 804 5 5 1 6 1 . 7 6 
25 . 9 9 7 6 4 1 5 2 6 4 8 9 6 . 2 0 . 9 9 4 5 6 5 2 2 5 6 4 7 8 . 2 6 
26 . 9 9 7 9 3 3 8 9 6 9 1 6 5 . 2 6 . 9 9 5 0 9 8 0 4 5 6 1 5 6 . 8 6 
27 . 9 9 8 1 6 1 7 8 7 3 5 9 5 . 5 5 . 9 9 5 0 9 8 0 4 4 7 6 4 9 . 5 1 
2 8 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32000 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
29 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35500 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 
30 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35000 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 . 0 0 
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Note that i f the mission planner's problem was solved and the decision 
was based on minimum expected cost , then the optimum capacity would 
also be 22 u n i t s . Table 6 presents the deployment strategies for the 
two object ive functions for 22 and 25 units of capaci ty . 
Table 6. Optimum Deployment Strategies Using 
Different Objective Functions 
Mission Planner Countermeasure Evaluator 
22 Units 25 Units 22 Units 25 Units 
C 4- * 
• 6 C I 1 0 I 1 
of Route Number Type Number Type Number Type Number Type 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CO
 1 2 1 2 1 2 6 1 
5 7 5 1 3 1 3 
5 1 3 1 3 2 
CO
 5 
6 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
A Fortran program was wr i t ten and used to make the calculat ions 
for these examples. I t i s found in the Appendix along with the optimum 
strategies for the countermeasure evaluation problem associated with 
each capacity from zero to 30 u n i t s . The computer time used in ca lcu­
l a t ing each of these problems was 15 seconds. The computer time needed 




CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The object ive of th is research was to develop a procedure that 
could be used to determine the optimum deployment strategies for 
expendable countermeasures. The need for such a procedure ar ises from 
two re la ted problems. F i r s t , new expendable countermeasure designs are 
being developed at a rapid pace, and the mi l i ta ry s e r v i c e s , being the 
primary user of these devices, must be able to evaluate the i r r e l a t i v e 
cost -e f fect iveness. Second, the operational user of expendable counter-
measures must plan for the i r employment pr ior to the mission in order 
to insure maximum probabi l i ty of mission success. 
The procedure presented in th is thesis should be considered as 
a method of obtaining information on which to base decisions rather than 
as an "automatic strategy s e l e c t o r . " The countermeasure evaluator 
usually considers more factors than cost-ef fect iveness in choosing the 
best design. These factors include addit ional workload on the p i l o t , 
maintenance requirements, l o g i s t i c s implications and del ivery schedules. 
The mission planner must also consider the fue l and ordnance required 
for the mission as w e l l as the countermeasures. 
The model developed in Chapter I I was purposely made simple to 
more eas i ly carry out the computations. However, by using the parameters 
that were incorporated into the constant term of the s ignal - to -noise 
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r a t i o e q u a t i o n ( 2 - 2 ) and t h e e x a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n SNR and p r o b a ­
b i l i t y o f d e t e c t i o n , t h e m o d e l w o u l d y i e l d more a c c u r a t e v a l u e s f o r 
p r o b a b i l i t y o f d e t e c t i o n . T h i s , a l o n g w i t h a d e t a i l e d m o d e l o f t h e 
o p e r a t o r r e s p o n s e w o u l d p r o v i d e a more e x a c t f i g u r e f o r p r o b a b i l i t y o f 
a i r c r a f t l o s s . A l s o a c o m p l e x m o d e l c o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d t o i n c l u d e 
s e v e r a l r a d a r s and m u l t i p l e a i r c r a f t . The i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e 
r a d a r s w o u l d r e q u i r e a m o d e l t h a t i s a b l e t o h a n d l e a v e r y l a r g e number 
o f p a r a m e t e r s s u c h a s a s i m u l a t i o n m o d e l . 
The d y n a m i c p r o g r a m m i n g a p p r o a c h u s e d t o s o l v e t h e s e s e q u e n t i a l 
d e c i s i o n p r o b l e m s a p p e a r s t o b e v e r y e f f i c i e n t . The c o m p u t a t i o n a l p r o ­
c e d u r e b a s e d on t h e r e c u r s i o n e q u a t i o n s i s e a s y t o i m p l e m e n t and w i l l 
a l w a y s y i e l d t h e opt imum s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m . By u s i n g t h i s p r o ­
c e d u r e t h e opt imum d e p l o y m e n t s t r a t e g y i s d e t e r m i n e d n o t o n l y f o r t h e 
c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n t s p e c i f i e d , b u t f o r e a c h i n t e g e r c a p a c i t y c o n s t r a i n t 
l e s s t h a n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s p e c i f i e d . I n f a c t , f o r e a c h s e c t i o n o f t h e 
r o u t e n<N, t h e opt imum d e c i s i o n s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e v e r y i n t e g e r v a l u e 
up t o t h e s p e c i f i e d c a p a c i t y . T h e r e f o r e , a l a r g e amount o f i n f o r m a t i o n 
t h a t can b e u s e d f o r s e n s i t i v i t y a n a l y s i s i s a v a i l a b l e w i t h n o a d d i ­
t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n s . 
I n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e opt imum d e p l o y m e n t s t r a t e g i e s f o r 
e x p e n d a b l e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s e m p l o y e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o n - b o a r d j a m ­
m e r s , t h e s c e n a r i o m o d e l can b e c h a n g e d t o i n c l u d e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
u s i n g o n - b o a r d jammers a t e a c h s e c t i o n o f t h e r o u t e . The m o d e l w o u l d 
n e e d t o d e t e r m i n e f o r e a c h s e c t i o n o f t h e r o u t e w h e t h e r i t i s b e t t e r 
t o u s e t h e o n - b o a r d jammer o n l y , t h e e x p e n d a b l e c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s o n l y , 
o r b o t h t h e e x p e n d a b l e and o n - b o a r d jammers t o g e t h e r . Only a s l i g h t 
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modification of the computer program i s needed to include t h i s , since 
the SNR equation of the model can already handle the power term assoc i ­
ated with the on-board jammer. By including the on-board jammer i n th is 
manner, i t i s not considered as one of the countermeasures in the set of 
countermeasures being evaluated. However, the optimum deployment s t r a t ­
egies for the on-board jammer and the expendable countermeasures can be 
obtained using th is procedure. 
The mathematical formulations of the problems in th is report con­
sider only a single capacity constraint . They could be formulated with 
d i f ferent constraints or with more than one constra int , and dynamic 
programming can s t i l l be used as the solut ion procedure. For example, 
the mission planner's problem could be solved with a constraint on 
volume and one on t o t a l cost of the countermeasures. This problem can 
be solved using two state var iables and a procedure s imi la r to the one 
presented in th is t h e s i s . 
Recommendations 
I n th is research a procedure was developed to determine the 
optimum deployment of countermeasures assuming a l l the parameters r e ­
la ted to the enemy radar system were known. A s imi la r procedure should 
be developed for the s i tua t ion where the penetrator i s faced by uncer­
ta inty as to the exact defensive system the enemy i s employing. Dynamic 
programming may be applicable for th is problem a lso . 
An obvious extension to the problems considered here would be to 
determine the optimum f l i g h t route along with the optimum deployment 
strategy for an a i r c r a f t facing a defensive system composed of numerous 
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radars. I t should be c lear that the route the penetrator uses w i l l 
a f fect the deployment strategy and i t s probabi l i ty of s u r v i v a l . 
In considering the countermeasure evaluator 's problem, the cost-
effect iveness i s found for a set of countermeasures employed against a 
f ixed defensive system. In comparing the di f ferent designs, more than 
one s i tuat ion should be considered. Several defensive system scenarios 
could be formulated and the 'cost -e f fect iveness could be determined with 
respect to each of these. Research could be done on how to determine 
the best countermeasure design from the resul ts of many scenarios. 
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APPENDIX 
THE COMPUTER PROGRAM AND OUTPUT 
6 4 
.Al ANGLE INCREMENT 
ANG COMPUTING ANGLE 
C CONSTANT 
CD DISTANCE USED IN CALCULATING SECTION LENGTH 
CS CROSS SECTION FOR CALCULATING 
CSTAC COST OF THE AIRCRAFT 
CSTJM COST OF THE JAMMER 
D DECISION ON NUMBER OF JAMMERS TO USE IN A SECTION 
F RETURN FOR THE SECTION 
JTYPE DECISION ON THE TYPE OF JAMMER TO USE IN A SECTION 
LOAD NUMBER OF JAMMERS LOADED IN MISSILE 
MAT MAXIMUM NUMBER OF JAMMERS THAT CAN BE USED 
MCAP MAXIMUM CAPACITY OF THE AIRCRAFT 
NC NUMBER OF RESOLUTION CELLS IN A SECTION 
NS NUMBER OF STAGES 
NTYPE NUMBER OF JAMMER TYPES CONSIDERED 
NU NUMBER OF UNITS OF CAPACITY THE JAMMER REQUIRES 
P PROBABILITY OF AIRCRAFT LOSS FOR THE SECTION 
PJAM POWER OF THE JAMMER 
PROB SUBROUTINE USED TO CALCULATE PROBABILITY OF AIRCRAFT LOSS 
PS PROBABILITY OF AIRCRAFT SURVIVAL 
RA MINIMUM RANGE OF THE AIRCRAFT TO THE RADAR 
RCS RADAR CROSS SECTION 
RJAM MINIMUM RANGE OF THE JAMMER TO THE RADAR 
RM RANGE OF THE MISSILE 
RR RADAR RANGE 
TD TRAVEL DISTANCE UNDER RADAR COVERAGE 
A»AN, I» I TEMP,JrJTEMP»K,L»MCAPI»N,NO,OD,OTYPErPK,Q,TEMPFrTEMPP 
ARE VARIABLES USED IN THE PROGRAM 
INTEGER 0»00(8»401)»OTYPE(8»401> 
DIMENSION ANG (8) ,RCS(8) , NC ( 8) t P { 8 ,401 > »F(8 r 401) »D< 8 , 401) »NU(6) * 


































THIS PART OF THE PROGRAM CALCULATES THE NUMBER OF STAGES* THE 
NUMBER OF RESOLUTION CELLSt THE CALCULATING ANGLES, AND THE CROSS 
SECTIONS. 
TD=2.*SQRT(RR**2-RA**2) 

























R C S ( K - I ) = C S ( I ) 
4 RCS(K+I-1)=CS(I ) 
5 WRITE(6,6)TD»CD,NS 
6 FORMAT(/»IX»'TRAVEL DIST = •»F5.2»4X»•COMPUTING DlST =»»F5.2'4X» 




B F0RMAT(/»1X,'CROSS SECTIONS'»3X»8F8.4) 
WRITE(6,9)NC 
9 FORMAT(/»1X»'NUMBER OF AZIMUTH CELLS' t3X t815) 









MATI I )= (K-1 ) /NU( I ) 
PK=PROB(MAT(I)*LOAD(I)rNC(N),RCS(N)»ANG(N),1) 
Q=CSTJM(I)*MAT(I)+CSTAC*PK 










I F ( K - J . L T . 0 ) G O T015 
TEMPF=1.0E38 
D013I=1,NTYPE 
IF(MOD(J- l»NU( I ) ) .NE.0)GOTO13 

















W R I T E ( 6 , 1 7 ) ( N O ( J ) » ( D ( I , J ) * J T Y P E ( I r J ) » P ( I » J ) r F ( I » J ) , 1 = 1 » 4 ) , J = l » 8 1 ) 
WRI1E(6»17) (NO(J) t ( D ( I » J ) » J T Y P E d r J ) »P( I»J> rF( I#J> »X=5»8> »J=1»81 ) 
17 FORMAT(/»6X»4(»DEC» rlX» »TYPE» »2X»»PROB f »2X»'RETURN* r 4 X ) r / ( 
* I5r4( lX»I3»I2»lX>F8.7»F11.2>)> 









P 5 ( K ) = P S ( K ) * ( 1 . - P ( N » I ) ) 
22 I=I-OD(N»K)*NU(L) 
23 CONTINUE 
WRITE(6 ,24) (NO(J)» <OD<I»J>rOTYPE(I»J)11 = 1 1 8 ) r P S ( J ) r F ( 8 1 J ) , J = 1 » 81) 
24 FORMAT(/» 8X»* STAGE 1»»4X,»STAGE 2»r4Xr»STAGE 3»#4Xr»STAGE 4»r4X» 
* * STAGE 5»r4X» ,STAGE 6»,4X»»STAGE 7* »4X»'STAGE 8»» 
* / » l X » » C A P . »f8( . DEC TYPE • ) 




THIS SUB-FUNCTION CALCULATES PROBABILITY OF AIRCRAFT LOSS USED IN 










1 PROb=0.0 RETURN 







PROD=(C*CS/( (RA/COS(A+3.*AI) ) * *4) ) / ( (P / (21 .25* (R j /COS(A) ) * *2) > + 
* ( P / ( 1 0 . * ( R J / C O S ( A + A I ) ) * * 2 ) ) + ( P / ( 3 . 2 5 * ( R J / C O S ( A + 2 . * A I ) ) * * 2 ) ) + 
* ( P / ( ( R J / C O S ( A + 3 . * A I ) ) * * 2 ) ) + ( P / ( 3 « 2 5 * ( R J / C 0 S ( A + 4 . * A I ) ) * * 2 ) > + 
* ( P / ( 1 0 . * ( R J / C O S ( A + 5 . * A I ) ) * * 2 ) ) • ( P / ( 2 1 . 2 5 * ( R J / C O S ( A + 6 . * A I ) ) * * 2 ) ) ) 







BOT=PJAM( IND) / ( (X+1 . ) * *2 ) * (RJ* *2 ) 
TOP=C*CS/((RA/COSU) ) * *4 ) 
PROD=TOP/BOT 










B 0 T = ( 2 . * P / ( 2 1 . 2 5 * ( R J * * 2 ) ) ) + ( 2 . * P / ( 1 0 • * ( R J * * 2 ) ) ) + 
* < 2 . * P / ( 3 . 2 5 * ( R J * * 2 ) ) ) + ( P / ( R J * * 2 ) ) 
PROD=TOP/bOT 





PRuD=l. / (ANJ+1.) 
4 PROB=PROD*( ,40-(RA/COS(A)) / l00. ) 
RETURN 
END 
TRAVEL DIST s 7 4 . 1 6 COMPUTING DIST = 4 0 . 0 0 NUMBER OF STAGES = ft 
ANGLES 1 . 1 0 7 1 4 8 7 2 . 9 2 7 2 9 5 2 2 . 5 8 8 0 0 2 6 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 5 8 8 0 0 2 6 0 . 9 2 7 2 9 5 2 2 1 . 1 0 7 1 4 8 7 2 
CROSS SECTIONS 2 . 0 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 3 0 * 0 0 0 0 . 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 2 . 0 0 0 0 
NUMBER OF AZIMUTH CELLS 4 6 12 2 2 2 2 1 2 6 4 
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 STAGE 4 
DEC TYPE PROB RETURN DEC TYPE PROB RETURN DEC TYPE PROB RETURN DEC TYPE PROB RETURN 
0 0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 1 6 1 4 7 4 . 5 0 0 5 . 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 2 2 5 3 . 3 3 0 5 . 2 1 9 7 2 2 4 9 4 9 0 0 5 . 8 7 0 5 . 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 6 7 5 4 . 4 1 
1 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 2 9 7 4 . 5 0 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 5 4 4 5 5 0 . 3 7 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 9 7 8 2 4 0 . 1 6 
2 2 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 2 0 0 0 6 8 . 0 6 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 5 8 0 1 0 4 . 2 7 
3 3 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 2 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 4 2 2 9 0 . 4 3 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 2 4 1 0 0 4 . 5 0 
4 4 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 8 5 6 9 2 . 1 4 
5 5 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 4 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 5 1 9 3 7 . 5 0 
6 
6 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 5 . 0 0 8 0 6 4 5 3 8 0 9 6 . 7 7 
7 7 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 
6 
1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 3 5 . 0 0 5 4 3 4 8 3 6 5 4 3 . 4 8 
8 8 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 7 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
6 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 3 6 2 1 5 . 6 9 
9 9 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 8 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 7 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 3 7 7 0 8 . 3 3 
1 0 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 9 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 . 0 0 8 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 3 9 2 0 0 . 9 8 
1 1 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 9 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 5 0 0 . 0 0 3 5 . 0 0 5 4 3 4 8 4 0 5 2 1 . 7 4 
1 2 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 4 0 1 9 6 . 0 8 
1 3 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 4 1 6 8 8 . 7 3 
1 4 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 5 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 
1 6 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 1 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 7 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 2 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 
1 8 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 2 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 9 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 2 1 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 0 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 3 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 1 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 2 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 2 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 3 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 3 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 4 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 
•ooooooo 
1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 4 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 5 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 5 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 •OOOOOOO 1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 6 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 7 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 3 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 9 2 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
3 0 3 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
1 7 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 
•ooooooo 
2 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
STAGE 5 STAGE 6 
DEC TYPE PROB RETURN DEC TYPE PROB RETURN 
0 0 5 . 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 2 7 5 6 5 . 8 0 0 5 . 2 1 9 7 2 2 4 1 8 1 9 2 5 9 , 1 6 
1 0 5 . 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 8 6 8 0 . 1 1 0 5 . 2 1 9 7 2 2 4 1 6 0 9 4 5 3 . 6 9 
2 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 1 0 0 7 0 1 7 . 6 5 0 5 . 2 1 9 7 2 2 4 1 3 3 5 0 5 9 , 3 6 
3 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 6 1 5 1 0 2 . 6 3 0 5 . 2 1 9 7 2 2 4 1 0 2 9 2 5 6 . 8 7 
4 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 2 8 1 3 0 1 . 3 0 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 6 4 5 9 8 7 , 2 7 
5 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 1 2 8 4 1 5 . 7 0 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 3 1 6 7 6 9 , 9 2 
6 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 9 5 1 8 8 . 4 8 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 1 6 5 9 8 3 , 8 5 
7 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 8 1 5 6 4 . 0 1 1 5 . 0 1 3 7 3 2 7 1 3 3 2 1 2 . 9 2 
8 2 5 . 0 0 8 0 6 4 5 6 7 9 5 0 . 8 3 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 8 8 . 4 8 
9 2 5 . 0 0 8 0 6 4 5 6 6 4 1 0 . 0 6 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 5 6 4 . 0 1 
1 0 3 5 . 0 0 5 4 3 4 8 6 4 9 3 1 . 8 3 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 9 5 0 . 8 3 
11 3 5 . 0 0 5 4 3 4 8 6 4 6 0 5 . 8 2 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 4 1 0 . 0 6 
1 2 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 6 4 2 9 3 . 0 6 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 9 3 1 . 8 3 
1 3 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 6 5 7 7 8 . 3 9 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 6 0 5 . 8 2 
1 4 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 6 7 2 6 3 . 7 2 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 2 9 3 . 0 6 
1 5 1 5 . 0 1 5 6 2 5 0 5 9 8 1 2 . 5 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7 7 8 . 3 9 
1 6 2 5 . 0 0 8 0 6 4 5 4 6 0 3 2 . 2 6 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 2 2 6 3 . 7 2 
1 7 3 5 . 0 0 5 4 3 4 8 4 4 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 8 1 2 . 5 0 
1 8 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 4 4 1 7 6 . 4 7 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 3 2 . 2 6 
1 9 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 4 5 6 6 9 . 1 2 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 
20 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 4 7 1 6 1 . 7 6 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 1 7 6 . 4 7 
21 3 5 . 0 0 5 4 3 4 8 4 8 4 7 8 . 2 6 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 6 6 9 . 1 2 
2 2 2 4 . 0 0 4 9 0 2 0 4 8 1 5 6 . 8 6 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 1 6 1 . 7 6 
2 3 2 4 . 0 0 ( 1 9 0 2 0 4 9 6 4 9 . 5 1 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 4 7 8 . 2 6 
2 4 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 1 5 6 . 8 6 
2 5 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 6 4 9 , 5 1 
2 6 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 7 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 8 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2 9 1 3 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 2 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 
3 0 1 3 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 6 1 • 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 . 0 0 
STAGE 7 
DEC TYPE PROB 
0 5 . 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 5 , 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 5 . 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 5 . 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 5 . 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
0 5 , 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• O O O O O O O 
• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
RETURN 
1 9 2 1 3 7 0 . 3 0 
1 7 4 3 0 3 5 . 6 4 
1 5 0 9 8 0 0 . 4 5 
1 2 4 9 8 6 8 . 3 4 
9 2 4 0 8 9 . 1 9 
6 4 4 2 5 4 . 4 3 
3 1 8 2 6 9 . 9 2 
1 6 7 4 8 3 . 8 5 
1 3 4 7 1 2 . 9 2 
1 0 1 6 8 8 . 4 8 
8 8 0 6 4 . 0 1 
7 4 4 5 0 . 8 3 
7 2 9 1 0 . 0 6 
7 1 4 3 1 . 8 3 
7 1 1 0 5 . 8 2 
7 0 7 9 3 . 0 6 
7 2 2 7 8 . 3 9 
7 3 7 6 3 . 7 2 
6 6 3 1 2 . 5 0 
5 2 5 3 2 . 2 6 
5 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 
5 0 6 7 6 . 4 7 
5 2 1 6 9 . 1 2 
5 3 6 6 1 . 7 6 
5 4 9 7 8 . 2 6 
5 4 6 5 6 . 8 6 
5 6 1 4 9 . 5 1 
3 0 5 0 0 . 0 0 
3 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
3 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 
3 5 0 0 0 . 0 0 
STAGE 8 
DEC TYPE PROB 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 
0 5 . 0 6 4 5 8 9 8 






• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
• O O O O O O O 
2 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 . O O O O O O O 
RETURN 
1 9 5 8 7 4 3 . 8 7 
1 7 9 1 9 2 7 . 8 1 
1 5 7 3 7 5 7 . 2 3 
1 3 3 0 6 1 4 . 0 9 
1 0 2 5 8 7 6 . 9 5 
7 6 4 1 1 6 . 6 6 
4 5 9 1 8 7 . 4 3 
3 1 8 1 4 0 . 6 0 
1 6 8 9 8 3 . 8 5 
1 3 6 2 1 2 . 9 2 
1 0 3 1 8 8 . 4 8 
8 9 5 6 4 . 0 1 
7 5 9 5 0 . 8 3 
7 4 4 1 0 . 0 6 
7 2 9 3 1 . 8 3 
7 2 6 0 5 . 8 2 
7 2 2 9 3 . 0 6 
7 3 7 7 8 . 3 9 
7 5 2 6 3 . 7 2 
6 7 8 1 2 . 5 0 
5 4 0 3 2 . 2 6 
5 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 
5 2 1 7 6 . 4 7 
5 3 6 6 9 . 1 2 
5 5 1 6 1 . 7 6 
5 6 4 7 8 . 2 6 
5 6 1 5 6 . 8 6 
5 7 6 4 9 . 5 1 
3 2 0 0 0 . 0 0 
3 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 
3 5 0 0 0 . 0 0 
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 STAGE 4 STAGE 5 STAGE 6 STAGE 7 STAGE 8 
IP. DEC TYPE DEC TYPE DEC TYPE DEC TYPE DEC TYPE DEC TYPE DEC TYPE DEC TYPE PROB SURV EXP COST 
0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 .21650245 1958743,87 
1 0 5 0 5 0 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 .28415947 1791927,81 
2 0 5 0 5 0 5 1 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 .37295930 1573757.23 3 0 5 0 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 .47141889 1330614.09 
4 0 5 0 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 .59587137 1025876,95 
5 0 5 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 0 5 0 5 .70102514 764116.66 
6 0 5 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 l 0 5 .82473545 459187.43 7 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 l 0 5 •88168319 318140.60 
a 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 l 1 1 .94256317 168983.85 
9 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 i 1 1 .95568728 136212.92 10 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 5 1 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .96899414 103188.48 n 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 1 5 1 2 1 i 1 1 .97643650 89564,01 12 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 2 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .98393602 75950.83 13 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 2 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .98654453 74410,06 14 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 5 3 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .98915997 72931,83 15 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 3 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .98968989 72605.82 16 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99022011 72293.06 17 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99022011 73778,39 18 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 4 2 4 1 2 1 . 1 1 1 .99022011 75263.72 19 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .98437500 67812,50 20 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99193549 54032.26 21 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99456522 52500.00 22 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99509804 52176,47 23 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99509804 53669,12 24 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99509804 55161.76 25 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 5 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99456522 56478.26 26 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99509804 56156.86 27 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 3 2 4 1 2 1 l 1 1 .99509804 57649,51 28 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 l 1 1 1.00000000 32000.00 29 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 l 2 1 1.00000000 33500.00 30 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 1 1.00000000 35000.00 
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